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Articles
The Unitary Executive Theory in Comparative
Context
DAVID M. DRIESEN†
The debate over the unitary executive theory—the theory that the President should have sole
control over the executive branch of government—has proven extremely parochial. Supporters of
the theory argue that the original intent of our country’s founders requires presidential control,
including a power to remove federal officials from their posts for political reasons. Opponents of
the theory rely on functional considerations and our practice of dispersing power more widely.
But neither side examines developments abroad to see what light other countries’ experience
might shed on the question of whether the Supreme Court should craft a new rule of constitutional
law cementing presidential control over the executive branch of government. This Article
examines that experience, primarily through case studies of recent democratic decline in
Hungary, Poland, and Turkey.
It shows that centralization of head-of-state control over the executive branch of government
provides a pathway to autocracy. Indeed, unilateral presidential control of the executive branch
constitutes a defining characteristic of autocracy.
In all of these countries, authoritarian leaders secured legislation or constitutional amendments
establishing effective head-of-state control over key bureaucracies that usually enjoy substantial
independence in a well-functioning democracy, such as the prosecution service, the electoral
commission, and the media authority. Autocrats use this power to shield their supporters from
prosecution while persecuting political opponents, to tilt the electoral playing field in favor of the
ruling party, and to shrink the public space for debate; thus, severely impairing democracy and
the rule of law.
Realization that the unitary executive paves the way for autocracy reframes the unitary executive
debate. We must ask whether the Supreme Court should establish a practice by judicial fiat that
authoritarians established through legislation and constitutional amendment. This Article
explains that our tradition favors a construction of the Constitution that reduces the risk of losing
our democracy and urges rejection of the unitary executive theory.

† University Professor, Syracuse University, Syracuse University College of Law, 950 Irving Ave.,
Syracuse, NY 13244-6070; driesen@law.syr.edu.
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INTRODUCTION
The debate over the unitary executive theory—the theory that the President
must have sole control over the executive branch of government—has been
extremely parochial.1 Unitary executive theory proponents (unitarians) claim
that the original intent of the Constitution’s Framers and Ratifiers (collectively,
the Founders) justifies the theory.2 Most of the theory’s opponents make
functional claims, describing an American constitutional custom of distributed
authority and suggesting that this practice fosters a desirable dialogue between
experts at various government agencies and the President.3 Yet, contemporary
scholars do not generally discuss experience abroad in debating the unitary
executive theory.4 This Article draws on comparative constitutional law to
inform the debate about the unitary executive theory.
It turns out that heads of state working to substitute autocracy for
constitutional democracy obtain centralized control over key government
agencies, such as the prosecution service. This centralized control enables them
to protect corrupt regime supporters, persecute political opponents, tilt the
electoral playing field, and shrink the public space for debate and opposition.5
The experience of autocrats undermining democratic government strongly
suggests that creating a unitary executive paves the way for autocracy. A
despotic President who obtains sole control over the executive branch of
government will likely use his authority to entrench himself in power and
undermine democracy and the rule of law upon which it depends.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court embraced the unitary executive theory,
with some exceptions, in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection
1. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1158 (1992) (noting that “unitary executive theorists” claim that the
President must have “direct control” over all executive officers); cf. id. at 1166 (discussing some differences in
the nature of the required control among supporters of the theory).
2. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104
YALE L.J. 541, 550 (1994) (stating that the Constitution’s text and history support the unitary executive theory);
see also Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Note, Hail to the Chief Administrator: The Framers and the President’s
Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 991–94 (1993) (arguing that the Framers’ intent supports the unitary
executive theory); cf. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL
POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 37–38 (2008) (arguing that the history of presidential support for the
unitary executive theory over time supports it).
3. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Foreword, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 759 (2007) [hereinafter Strauss, Overseer] (arguing that the President oversees
government agencies, but that the Constitution does not require the President to have the power to decide all
issues himself); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers Questions—A
Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 492 (1987) [hereinafter Strauss, Formal and Functional]
(suggesting a functional approach to deciding separation of powers questions affecting administrative agencies);
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 581 (1984) [hereinafter Strauss, Place of Agencies] (assuming that useful analysis must
largely accept existing reality).
4. Cf. M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 603, 651, 653 n.125 (2001) (describing fragmentation of power within branches of government as “our
assurance against threatening concentrations of government power”).
5. See generally Aziz Huq & Tom Ginsburg, How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy, 65 UCLA L. REV.
78 (2018).
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Bureau.6 The Seila Law Court struck down a for-cause removal provision
preserving the independence of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(CFPB), on the ground that the President has a constitutional right to fire its
director for political reasons.7 But Seila Law, a 5-4 decision, stands in
considerable tension with earlier cases.8 The Court should consider the capacity
of a unitary executive to unravel democracy in future cases as it reconciles its
holding in Seila Law with prior cases less hospitable to the unitary executive
theory. Indeed, this Article’s analysis suggests that the Court should consider
overruling Seila Law in light of the potential danger its extreme unitary
executive theory poses to democracy and the rule of law.
In spite of the lack of recent domestic legal scholarship considering
whether head-of-state control over the executive branch catalyzes autocracy, the
idea that unchecked presidential control over the executive branch of
government endangers democracy and the rule of law in the long run is not new
to the American constitutional law tradition.9 The founders of this country
appreciated that danger and denied the President sole control over the executive
branch of government based on their study of experience abroad and their desire
to preserve a republic, providing a congressional role in both the appointment
and removal of executive branch officials.10 Furthermore, some of our most
esteemed statesman and Supreme Court Justices—such as Alexander Hamilton,
Joseph Story, Daniel Webster, and Louis Brandeis—recognized the danger
complete presidential control over the executive branch poses to democracy.11
Yet, the contemporary debate on the unitary executive theory pays little
heed to this ancient wisdom and contemporary experience, exhibiting the
parochialism that characterizes much of American constitutional law in recent
years. Neither the majority nor the dissent in Seila Law address the lessons of
comparative constitutional law for the unitary executive theory. In the United
States, unlike in most constitutional law courts, the practice of considering
experience of other countries in constitutional adjudication has proven
controversial.12 A devout originalist may reject consideration of any recent
6. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020).
7. Id. at 2197–98.
8. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659–60 (1988) (upholding a statute making a counsel
investigating high level wrongdoing independent of presidential control except in the case of breaches of duty);
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631–32 (1935) (upholding the independence of the Federal
Trade Commission).
9. Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. REV.
515, 516 (2018) (stating that “presidential administration is morphing into autocracy”).
10. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 670–75 (holding that the Appointments Clause authorizes vesting the power
to appoint an independent counsel in the judiciary and quoting the Appointments Clause, which requires Senate
approval of principal officers); id. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the Constitution authorizes
Senate removal after impeachment); see also Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers, 129 YALE
L.J. 378, 389 (2019) (discussing George Washington’s concern that a “chief” of a faction could inaugurate
“permanent despotism”).
11. See infra notes 63–66 and accompanying text.
12. Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law:
Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 752
(2005) (discussing the debate). I do not mean to imply that the Supreme Court constitutes a constitutional court
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experience, especially foreign experience, as inappropriate.13 In other words,
originalists may believe that constitutional interpretation requires the rejection
of all experience and wisdom, save that captured in the statements of our
Constitution’s Framers.
This parochialism, however, proves ironic, for the Framers extensively
studied experience abroad before drafting the Constitution.14 Nor is learning
lessons from other countries foreign to our separation of powers jurisprudence.
As recently as the Youngstown decision in 1952, the Supreme Court extensively
considered the experience of democracy loss (in Nazi Germany) in reaching a
judgment about the scope of presidential power.15 In other words, our tradition
does not require that contestable originalist claims defeat all wisdom and
subsequent experience.
Furthermore, the Framers did articulate concerns about where sole
presidential control over the executive branch could lead based on their study of
history.16 And they assured anxious citizens deciding whether to ratify the
Constitution that they had not left the executive branch completely separated
from control by Congress. Instead of adopting a pure system of separation of
powers, Alexander Hamilton explained, they hedged their bets by introducing
numerous checks on presidential power.17
This Article presents the background debate on the unitary executive
theory, evaluates the experience from democracy loss abroad, and then explains
how an appropriate response to this experience can safeguard our democracy, in
spite of the Court’s misstep in Seila Law. The first Part presents the background.
It explains the unitary executive theory and discusses its reception in the
Supreme Court and the executive branch. It then turns to the scholarly debate on
the unitary executive theory, showing that previous work has often focused on
formalist claims based on constitutional text and history or upon practice and
general functional considerations, rather than upon the role of centralized power
over the executive branch in undermining the rule of law and democracy abroad.
It establishes that the Founders sought to craft a Constitution immune from
democratic backsliding. It argues that this intent, which united the Framers’
views with those who made the Framers’ proposal into an enacted charter of
government by ratifying the Constitution, creates a principle of constitutional
construction, which should influence how a Court resolves the more specific

in a strict sense. But it shares with the constitutional courts a leading role in the adjudication of constitutional
claims.
13. Id. at 885 (noting that the Court rarely refers to foreign law cases “where the decision . . . depends
primarily on an interpretation of the original meaning” or in structural constitutional law cases).
14. See WILLIAM R. EVERDELL, THE END OF KINGS: A HISTORY OF REPUBLICS AND REPUBLICANS 150–70
(2d ed. 2000).
15. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593, 649–51 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that the “experience through which the world has passed” in
Nazi Germany shows the need to construe the Constitution to maintain checks and balances).
16. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that the Constitution places
“every practicable obstacle” in place to combat foreign influence upon and corruption of the President).
17. See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
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debates over the unitary executive theory. The Court should construe the
Constitution to preserve democracy and the rule of law.
The next Part analyzes the role that centralized administration plays in
undermining the rule of law and democracy. It explains that democracies
generally rely heavily upon a civil service insulated from political interference,
formally independent agencies, and a tradition of limiting centralized control
over prosecution and other government decisions in order to establish a rule of
law. It shows, using case studies of democratic erosion in Hungary, Turkey, and
Poland, that autocrats seeking to subvert democratic governments secure
constitutional changes restructuring the executive branch to facilitate centralized
control over key bureaucracies. It then describes how this centralization
substantially impairs the rule of law by defeating the principle that the law
applies equally to all. Once an autocrat establishes control over prosecution and
administration, the autocrat’s minions apply the law vigorously to regime
opponents, while giving corrupt supporters of the autocratic regime a free pass.
This politically skewed application converts laws designed to achieve legitimate
public policy goals into a pretext for repressing opposition and empowering
regime supporters. The defeat of the rule of law impairs fair elections and tilts
the media space toward the ruling regime, thereby undermining democracy. All
of this implies that a unitary executive poses a threat to constitutional
democracy’s survival.
The final Part analyzes the implications of the realization that a unitary
executive provides a pathway to autocracy. It considers the possibility that even
with the opening up of a path to autocracy, an autocratic American President
may not go down that path because of external constraints. It argues that Senate
tolerance of an autocratic President probably provides a sufficient condition for
autocracy to greatly undermine the rule of law and imperil democracy, an
argument anticipated by the Anti-Federalists at the Founding. It explains why
the lessons from democracy loss abroad suggest that judicial enforcement of
constitutional rights does not provide an adequate check on a President able to
command prosecutors and other civil servants to do his bidding. The experience
abroad and a sound combination of political science and constitutional theory
also show that political remedies likely will fail to protect a country from
autocracy when partisan division makes the danger most acute.
This final Part continues by analyzing Seila Law’s likely effect on
autocracy’s long term prospects in the United States. It argues that the Court
should keep its older precedent rejecting the unitary executive theory intact,
including precedent that accepts statutory provisions that only provide for
removal of executive branch officials for cause. The Court should therefore
narrowly construe or overrule Seila Law. It shows, in particular, that for-cause
removal authority suffices to allow the President to perform the role of taking
care that the law be faithfully executed, and that the Constitution therefore does
not clearly require at-will removal authority. Therefore, the Court should allow
the Congress some latitude to decide whether for-cause or at-will removal
authority should govern under the Horizontal Sweeping Clause, which
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authorizes Congress to structure the executive branch of government, as the
Seila Law dissent argued.18
The final Part also analyzes several less direct potential implications of the
Seila Law Court’s embrace of the unitary executive theory—namely rejection of
the possibility of presidential obstruction of justice and sharp limitation of
congressional authority over subpoenas. It argues that Seila Law makes
subpoena authority and acceptance of the possibility of presidential obstruction
of justice even more important to democracy preservation than they have been
in the past, even as that case diminishes the likelihood of executive branch
prosecution of obstruction of justice claims against the President. Each of these
issues merits its own article, so the analysis of these specific matters remains
suggestive and limited. Still, this Article explains that the Court should take the
role head-of-state power over the executive branch plays in establishing
autocracies into account, and that doing so has important ramifications.

I. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY
This Part begins with a description and analysis of the unitary executive
theory and the Supreme Court cases addressing it. It then explains that even
before Seila Law, the executive branch practice had moved toward a unitary
model. It canvasses the recent scholarly debate on the unitary executive theory,
showing that original intent and United States constitutional custom have
dominated the debate, with no attention paid to experience abroad. On the other
hand, it shows that both the Founders and Supreme Court Justices have paid
attention to experience abroad in the past. Finally, this Part argues that the
Founders aimed to create a Constitution to preserve a republic through a rule of
law and that the Supreme Court should construe the Constitution to further that
aim.
A. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson provides the most succinct
and cogent judicial articulation of the unitary executive theory.19 The Morrison
majority upheld provisions of the Ethics in Government Act (Act)20 creating an
independent counsel to investigate and prosecute high ranking officials’
crimes.21 In order to prevent presidential interference with independent counsel
investigation and prosecution, Congress lodged the authority to appoint an
independent counsel in the judiciary and only authorized the Attorney General

18. See William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President
and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of “the Sweeping Clause”, 36 OHIO ST. L.J.
788, 793–94 (1975) (arguing that the Horizontal Sweeping Clause authorizes Congress to imply presidential
powers); see also Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2227 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Justice Kagan concurred in the judgment on severability and dissented on the relevant issue of for cause removal.
19. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–99 (1982) (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591–99 (2018)).
21. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 659–60.
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to remove him for “good cause.”22 While the Supreme Court upheld the Act’s
removal and appointment provisions and rejected the unitary executive theory,23
Justice Scalia dissented on the grounds that these provisions interfered with
presidential control over the executive branch of government.24
Justice Scalia’s dissent relies on the proposition that the President
possesses “all executive” power under the Constitution.25 This proposition,
Scalia argued, stems from the Vesting Clause, Article II, § 1, cl. 1, which
provides, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States,” without using the word “all” found in describing Congress’ legislative
power in Article I.26 Since the statute “deprive[s] the President . . . of exclusive
control over the exercise” of a “purely executive power” (namely prosecution),
argued Scalia, it conflicts with the Framers’ decision to give the President “all”
executive power.27 This statement treats the Vesting Clause’s grant of
“executive power” as a grant of “exclusive control,” thereby implying that the
President does not share control of the executive branch with Congress or other
federal officials.
Justice Scalia equated control with the power to appoint and remove
executive branch officials.28 For Scalia, the President’s ability, through the
Attorney General, to remove the Prosecutor “for cause” does not suffice; the
President must have the ability to remove without cause.29 He strongly suggested
that presidential control implies rejection of “an attitude of independence against
the” President’s “will” among officers of the executive branch of government in
favor of a system where all hold their office only if their conduct pleases the
President.30 In other words, he equated control over the executive branch of
government with the power to fire all of those carrying out executive duties for
any reason or no reason whatsoever. Likewise, Justice Scalia found the inability
of the President, through the Attorney General, to exercise control over the
appointment of the independent counsel inconsistent with presidential control
over the executive branch.31
22. Id. at 660–64 (majority opinion) (describing these provisions in detail).
23. Id. at 670–97.
24. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25. Id. (describing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 as lodging “all of the executive power [in the President]”).
26. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1). But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (vesting “all” legislative
authority in Congress).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 726 (“[T]he constitutional principle that the President had to be the repository of all executive
power . . . necessarily means that he must be able to discharge those who do not perform executive functions
according to his liking.”).
29. See id. at 706–07 (explaining why good cause removal does not amount to complete control).
30. Scalia implies this through his argument that “good cause” removal provisions limit the removal power.
See id. at 706–07. He points out that a person who can only be removed for good cause does not serve at the
President’s pleasure. Id. at 707. Indeed, the purpose of a good cause removal provision is to allow the person
protected by it to “maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will.” Id. (quoting Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935)). By rejecting good cause removal, Scalia implicitly rejects
executive branch independence from presidential will.
31. See id. at 701–03, 707 (criticizing the appointment provisions because they “severely confine” the
Attorney General’s ability to refuse appointment of an independent counsel). Justice Scalia also emphasizes the
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I shall refer to the idea that presidential control over the executive branch
implies presidential control over appointment and removal as the “patronage
state theory.”32 While this term highlights the possibility that presidential control
can be used to advance a faction’s interest, a chief concern of the Framers, I do
not mean to deny that Presidents can use their power to serve rule of law values
instead. The patronage state theory constitutes a central element of the larger
theory of the unitary executive.33
Justice Scalia justified this control, in part, by endorsing a presidential
prerogative to make political decisions about prosecution. Justice Scalia
described prosecutorial discretion as involving a balance of “legal, practical, and
political” considerations.34 Prosecutors must balance these factors, wrote Scalia,
in deciding whether to prosecute “technical violation[s]” at all.35 He then
claimed that the Constitution lodges control over prosecutorial discretion,
including decisions about when not to prosecute violations, in the President.36
Moreover, Justice Scalia envisioned an executive branch “attuned to the interests
and the policies of the Presidency.”37
I will refer to this idea that the President must have exclusive control over
the politics of executive branch decision-making as the unitary executive
theory’s “political dimension.” The political dimension implies that a President
could choose which law violators to prosecute based on political considerations.
Accepting the unitary executive theory’s political dimension allows the
President to refrain from prosecuting his supporters’ illegal conduct, while
unleashing the government’s full prosecutorial wrath upon his opponents. More

separation of powers principle that each department must have “defense . . . commensurate to the danger of
attack.” Id. at 704. Justice Scalia applies this principle to the executive branch, which he sees as under attack in
Morrison. See id. at 703 (criticizing the statute for commencing investigations without the assent of the
“President or his authorized subordinates”). He identifies the constitutional need to defend the executive branch
as giving “comprehensible content to the Appointments Clause.” Id. at 704. And this content leads him to reject
the majority’s decision to uphold judicial appointment of the independent counsel. See id. at 713.
32. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151 (1926) (explaining that Congressional opposition to a
custom of presidential removal arose in response to the “use of patronage for political purposes”); HAROLD H.
BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 408–09 (2006)
(describing President Jackson’s introduction of the policy of wholesale removal of holdover appointees as an
innovation justified as serving democracy that soon “degenerated into a ‘spoils system’ of patronage and
cronyism”); cf. John Yoo, Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 425–26 (2008) (citing President
Jefferson’s introduction of the spoils system—the practice of rewarding supporters with offices in the
government—as an effort to assert personal presidential control over “all law enforcement”).
33. See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 2, at 4 (characterizing presidential claims of removal power as
decisive evidence that Presidents “have believed in the theory of the unitary executive”).
34. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (describing the balancing of these
factors as “the very essence of prosecutorial discretion”).
35. Id. at 707–08.
36. Id. (stating that taking control of this balancing from the President “remove[s] the core of the
prosecutorial function” from “Presidential control”); accord Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs., 528
U.S. 167, 209–10 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the President’s duty to faithfully execute the
law requires him to be able to decide to refrain from prosecuting violators of environmental statutes). But see
Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L.
REV. 1559, 1594–95 (2007) (explaining that nonenforcement of statutes can undermine the rule of law).
37. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 712.
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broadly, this political dimension empowers the President to exercise more power
than is strictly necessary to ensure faithful execution of the law.38 In a situation
in which an executive branch official must choose between two actions, both of
which comply with the law, the “political dimension” insists that the sitting
President’s political preference becomes the determining factor in making the
decision.39 More troubling, the President and loyal subordinates may support
policies in considerable tension with the goals of the law they should administer.
The political dimension—the idea that the President’s personal preferences must
govern administration—can lead to opportunistic construction of the law, which
can distort it.40
The unitary executive theory’s political dimension lies at the heart of the
unitary executive theory’s tendency to undermine the rule of law.41 While
unitarians do not endorse perversion of statutes or consider selective prosecution
for political purposes, the political dimension of the unitary executive theory can
significantly undermine the rule of law.
Prior to Seila Law, however, the Supreme Court had not accepted the
unitary executive theory. The Morrison majority held that the statutory provision
allowing the Attorney General to remove the independent counsel “for cause”
provides for sufficient presidential control over prosecution under the
Constitution.42 It recognized that a “for-cause” removal provision suffices to
ensure the rule of law.43 An ability of the President through the Attorney General
to use for-cause removal authority to fire a special prosecutor who commits
abuses of office by persecuting the innocent, exonerating the guilty, extorting
money from the accused, and the like suffices to allow the President to “take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.”44 The majority’s holding, however,
rejects the political dimension of the unitary executive theory, at least
implicitly.45 It does not accept the notion that the President’s political

38. See 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624 (1841) (recognizing that an officer honestly exercising discretion within
statutory bounds faithfully executes law); cf. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (requiring the President to “take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed”).
39. Prakash, supra note 2, at 992 (opining that whenever a statute grants an executive branch official
discretion, the Constitution authorizes the President to “control that discretion”).
40. Accord EDWARD CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957, 80–81 (4th ed. 2008)
(opining that allowing the President to substitute his own judgment for that of any agency would convert all law
enforcement questions into discretionary questions controlled by “an independent and legally uncontrollable
branch of the government”).
41. See Stephen Skowronek, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A Developmental
Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2077 (2009) (the unitary executive theory
“discounts . . . objective . . . administration . . . and advances . . . an administration run in strict accordance with
the President’s priorities”).
42. See Morrison, 487 U.S. at 691–92 (holding that the for-cause removal provision does not strip the
President of all means of removing the officer).
43. See id. at 692 (discussing that the for-cause removal provision provides “ample” authority to secure
“‘faithful execution’ of the laws”).
44. See id. (noting that the removal provision does allow removal for misconduct).
45. See id. at 695–96 (finding the lack of complete presidential control over the independent counsel
acceptable because of the for-cause removal provision and the requirement that the independent counsel
generally follow Justice Department policy).
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preferences must control decisions about whom to investigate or prosecute under
the Constitution.46
The Morrison majority also considered the independent counsel an inferior
officer and therefore upheld the statute’s provision providing for judicial
appointment of an independent counsel.47 It justified this characterization by
noting the narrowness of the independent counsel’s responsibilities.48 Scalia,
however, in keeping with his view that Article II requires strict hierarchical
presidential control over the executive functions of government, would have
interpreted the term inferior officer as only including those subject to direction
by a superior.49
The Morrison decision rejecting subordination of prosecution to
presidential politics comports with our early history and long-standing traditions
of prosecutorial independence. In the early days, Congress relied heavily on state
officials and private parties to enforce federal law.50 The Judiciary Act of 1789
authorized the President to appoint a U.S. Attorney in each judicial district to
enforce federal law, but in practice they acted quite independently and the
Judiciary Act did not explicitly authorize presidential removal.51
We also have a constitutional custom of generally insulating prosecutorial
decisions from political influence.52 While the President always appointed the
Attorney General with the advice and consent of the Senate, that official in the
early days merely advised the President and defended the United States in the
Supreme Court, leaving prosecution to the independent district attorneys.53 In
1891, when Congress expanded the Attorney General’s power by creating the
Department of Justice (DOJ), the President lacked the power to remove the
Attorney General, the District Attorneys, and other high ranking DOJ officials
because the Tenure of Office Act prohibited their removal without the Senate’s
consent.54
Scalia’s advocacy of the political dimension of the unitary executive
theory, however, had some precedential support even before Seila Law, albeit
only in dicta. He drew upon former President and Supreme Court Justice Taft’s

46. See id. at 692 (finding that the President’s ability to have the Attorney General remove an independent
counsel who fails to perform his duties suffices to allow the President to ensure faithful execution of the laws).
47. See id. at 671–77 (holding that independent counsel is an inferior officer and therefore that the literal
language of the Constitution authorizes her appointment by the judiciary).
48. See id. at 671–72 (referring to the independent counsel’s “limited duties” and “limited . . . jurisdiction”
as justifications for characterizing her as an inferior officer).
49. See id. at 719–21 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (defining an inferior officer as a “subordinate” officer).
50. Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without
Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. REV. 121, 128–29 (2014) (characterizing the early system of law
enforcement as “incredibly” decentralized in part because of its reliance of state and private enforcement).
51. See id. at 129–30.
52. See id. at 170–71 (explaining that the DOJ Act contributed to fostering norms of independence sought
by its drafters over the long term).
53. See id. at 129 (setting out the Attorney General’s limited statutory duties and stating that the Attorney
General “exercised no control” over the district attorneys).
54. See id. at 164.
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opinion for the Court in Myers v. United States.55 Myers held that Congress
could not condition presidential removal of an executive officer upon the
consent of the Senate.56 In dicta, former President Taft suggested not only that
the Senate could not control the removal decision, but also that Congress must
permit the President to remove Officers of the United States at will, thus
endorsing the political dimension of the unitary executive theory.57 Justice Taft,
however, limited the effect of this position by stating that Congress could protect
officials not appointed by the Senate from politically motivated removal by
statutory provisions only permitting removal for cause.58 Otherwise, Taft
recognized, his position would doom the civil service law that Congress had
enacted a few decades earlier to defeat the patronage system, under which
political support for the President (often in the form of a campaign contribution)
was necessary to gain a post in the federal government.59 Similar civil service
laws seeking to insulate administration from partisan politics have become a
hallmark of constitutional democracies around the world.
Furthermore, Taft affirmed that Congress could expand the class of those
subject to civil service protections.60 The Myers Court assumed that Congress
could determine who constituted an inferior officer subject to appointment by
the judiciary, a head of department, or the President acting alone; and who was
a principle officer that must be appointed by joint action of the Senate and the
President. Thus, in spite of the blow Myers delivered to legislative supremacy
by prohibiting Congress from conditioning removal of Senate confirmed
officials upon Senate consent, the Myers Court implicitly recognized that
congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause allowed
Congress to decide upon the classification of officers.61 The entire Supreme
Court, however, backed formalist judicial supremacy in Morrison rather than
deference to Congress, as both the majority and dissent supported judicial
definitions of inferior officers.62
The dissenting Justices in Myers read the Constitution as giving Congress
control over both the term of office and removal, partly based on the belief that
55. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 723 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Congress may not
restrict the “President’s power to remove principal officers” exercising “purely executive powers”) (citing Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 127 (1926)).
56. Myers, 272 U.S. at 176 (holding a statutory restriction preventing the firing of a Postmaster General
without the Senate’s consent unconstitutional).
57. See id. at 127 (stating that the Constitution prevents congressional regulation of removal).
58. See id. at 162 (suggesting that Congress may avoid the evil of political removal of inferior officers by
making sure they are not appointed by the President with the Senate’s consent).
59. See id. at 173–74 (affirming that the Senate can continue to combat the “evil of the spoils system”
through the civil service laws by classifying officers as not requiring Senate approval for their appointment).
60. See id. at 174 (stating that by vesting the appointment of officers “in the heads of departments”
Congress can extend merit system protections to more officers of the United States).
61. See id. (affirming that Congress has power to include more officers in the civil service system, without
explicitly identifying the source of the power).
62. Compare Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 671–72 (1988) (classifying the independent counsel as an
inferior officer because he has limited powers and can be removed by the Attorney General), with id. at 719
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that the independent counsel is not an inferior officer because she is not
subordinate to anybody in the executive branch).
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a right of removal could become the basis for establishing an autocracy. Justice
Brandeis saw the Founders’ decision to reject “uncontrollable” presidential
removal as part of the separation of powers designed “to save the people from
autocracy.”63 He found the inference of such a power inconsistent with the
rejection of “customary” monarchial “prerogatives” in Article II and the decision
to rely on “representative assemblies for the protection of . . . liberties.”64
Quoting Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story, Justice McReynolds opined that
an “unlimited power of removal” may become an “instrument of the worst
oppression, and most vindictive vengeance.”65 McReynolds also cited Senator
Daniel Webster’s concerns that an absolute removal power would turn public
officers into “sycophants . . . and man-worshippers.”66
While Taft’s destruction of the Senate’s removal authority would prove
long-lived, the Court pushed back against the idea of constitutionally required
at-will removal not long after it handed down Myers. When President Roosevelt
relied on Myers to remove a Federal Trade Commissioner in order to replace
him with somebody supportive of the President’s policy views, the Court balked
and repudiated the Myers dicta requiring at-will removal in Humphrey’s
Executor v. United States.67 It went on to explain that the Myers dicta could not
possibly apply to the Federal Trade Commission, because it was carrying out
quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial duties, unlike the Postmaster whose removal
led to the Myers decision.68 The Humphrey’s Executor Court held that Congress
could make quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative officers independent from
presidential control.69 Subsequently, the Court applied Humphrey’s Executor’s
reasoning to overturn President Eisenhower’s decision to remove a member of
the War Claims Commission (a quasi-judicial body judging compensation
claims).70 The Humphrey’s Executor Court, however, suggested that the
President may retain power to remove “purely executive officers” without
Senate approval.71
The Humphrey’s Executor decision also began the work of correcting
Justice Taft’s misreading of the “decision of 1789.”72 Justice Taft, unable to find

63. Myers, 272 U.S. at 292–93 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 293–95; cf. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2228 (2020)
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (pointing out that even under the English monarchy “Parliament often restricted the
King’s power to remove royal officers”).
65. Myers, 272 U.S. at 179 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 1533 (1833)).
66. Id. (quoting 11 REG. DEB. 469–70 (1835)).
67. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States 295 U.S. 602, 618–19, 626 (1935) (disapproving of statements in
Myers tending to support the idea that for-cause removal protection is improper).
68. See id. at 627–28 (explaining that the FTC performs judicial and legislative function unlike the
executive functions carried out by the postmaster in Myers).
69. See id. at 629 (stating that congressional authority to make “quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies”
independent “of executive control cannot well be doubted”).
70. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958).
71. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631–32. But see Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S.
477, 492 (2015) (reiterating Myers’ erroneous discussion of the “Decision of 1789”).
72. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631.
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any support for the Myers result in the pre-ratification materials bearing on
original intent, interpreted a debate among members of the First Congress as
endorsing the principle that the President alone had the constitutional authority
to remove officers confirmed by the Senate.73 Legal historians, however,
consider the debates ambiguous and note a diversity of views among members
of the First Congress about whether the President enjoys unilateral removal
authority.74 The Humphrey’s Executor Court noted that the First Congress did
not make all high officials subject to presidential removal.75
Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener recognized the constitutionality of
formally independent agencies, which are set up as non-partisan expert bodies
insulated from presidential political decisionmaking.76 Democracies around the
world have adopted the concept of independent agencies. It is common for
agencies vital to democracy, like electoral commissions and media authorities,
to be independent agencies.77
In Seila Law, however, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not
protect the director of an independent agency not headed by a commission from
politically motivated removal. More importantly, it partially embraced the
unitary executive theory articulated in Justice Scalia’s dissent, albeit without
citing it.78 It created a rule that the President enjoys unrestricted removal
authority subject to two exceptions.79 First, Congress may offer for-cause
removal protection for members of “multimember expert agencies that do not
wield substantial executive power.”80 Second, the Court accepted restrictions on

73. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (concluding that the congressional decision of
1789 setting up executive departments adopted a view that the President has power to remove principal officers
without Senate approval).
74. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 36–
41 (1997); Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 211, 233–42 (1989); Edward S. Corwin, Tenure of Office and the Removal Power Under the
Constitution, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 353, 361–64 (1927); Saikrishna Prakash, New Light on the Decision of 1789,
91 CORNELL L. REV. 1021, 1023–1026 (2006); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Indecisions of 1789: Strategic
Ambiguity and the Imaginary Unitary Executive (Part I) 19–27 (Fordham Legal Stud. Res. Paper, No. 3596966,
2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3596566.
75. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631.
76. See generally Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15 (2010); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and
Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769 (2013); Jennifer L. Selin, What Makes an Agency Independent?,
59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971 (2015).
77. Daniel Montalvo, Trust in Electoral Commissions, AMERICASBAROMETER INSIGHTS, August, 31, 2009,
at 1, https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/I0823en_v2.pdf (discussing the nations that have a democratic
system of government use independent election commissions to ensure that elections are fair and impartial).
78. Compare Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020) (stating that
“[t]he entire ‘executive Power’ belongs to the President alone” after quoting the Vesting and Take Care Clauses),
with Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the President possesses
“all of the executive power” after quoting the Vesting Clause).
79. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2198; cf. id. at 2225 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (denying the existence of a general
rule requiring unrestricted removal).
80. Id. at 2199–2200.
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presidential removal of “inferior officers with limited duties and no
policymaking or administrative authority.”81
The Court’s justification for this result, which the dissent and the lower
courts found inconsistent with Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison, is not
entirely clear.82 For this Article’s purposes, however, two aspects of the rationale
loom especially large. First, using strikingly authoritarian language, the Court
justified its constitutional rule requiring a presidential power to fire people for
political reasons by stating that executive branch officials “must fear
and . . . obey” the President.83 Second, the Court justified requiring unlimited
removal authority over the lone director of an agency as a “structural protection[]
against the abuse of power . . . critical to preserving liberty.”84 The Seila Law
Court treats the bureaucrat, not the President, as the threat to liberty that the
Constitution must guard against.85
B. RECENT EXECUTIVE BRANCH PRACTICE
Even before Seila Law, recent Presidents have pushed to establish a unitary
executive. In the opinion of Supreme Court Justice (and former Harvard Law
School Dean and Solicitor General) Elena Kagan, as well as other legal scholars,
governmental practice now resembles the unitary executive model more closely
than many had supposed.86
The trend favoring centralized control of administration arguably began
under President Reagan. Prior to Reagan, even agencies that Congress had not
set up as formally independent agencies had a lot of functional independence.87
President Nixon, for example, had insisted on an independent Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) as a means of ensuring that business elites would not
capture it.88 Reagan promulgated an executive order that ended most
government agencies’ independence.89 This order requires a White House
81. Id. at 2200.
82. See id. at 2233–36 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d
680, 684 (9th Cir. 2019); PHH Corp. v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 881 F.3d 75, 110 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en
banc); David M. Driesen, Political Removal and the Plebiscitary Presidency: An Essay on Seila Law LLC v.
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 76 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2021).
83. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)).
84. Id. at 2202 (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986)).
85. Id. at 2203 (treating the powerful lone director of the CFPB as an affront to the liberty protected
principle of divided power and the President as a structural exception to this principle, vindicated by
extraordinary political accountability).
86. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246–47 (2001); Kovacs,
supra note 9, at 562 (claiming that the unitary executive theory is no longer theory in light of the President’s
growing power); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683, 685–86 (2016).
87. See Lisa Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743, 1766
(2019) (noting that prior to President Reagan, Presidents “tried to avoid meddling in agencies’ regulatory work”).
88. See Robert V. Percival, Checks Without Balance: Executive Office Oversight of the Environmental
Protection Agency, 54 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 127, 131–32 (1991) (noting that Nixon endorsed “a strong,
independent” EPA in spite of some opposition within his cabinet).
89. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982); see Mannheim &
Watts, supra note 87, at 1766 (characterizing Reagan’s order as “set[ting] the stage for greater presidential
involvement” in regulation).
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office—the Office of Management and Budget—to review major agency rules.90
While the order formally relies on the need for cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to
justify this review, in practice, OIRA reviews rules even in the many cases when
CBA is not possible and insists on changes for a variety of reasons having little
to do with CBA (even when a CBA is done).91 One might view the use of CBA
as an aid to dynamic statutory interpretation conforming statutes to emerging
elite views about what sensible law does,92 but the DOJ recognized that changing
law through executive order raises rule of law issues and insisted that the order’s
instructions only permit changing rules “to the extent permitted by law.”93
Critics of the order have charged that the order has nonetheless triggered a host
of illegal actions and it certainly contributed significantly to widespread
violation of statutory deadlines.94 Thus, it undermined the rule of law in at least
some respects and moved us closer to having a unitary executive.
Subsequent Presidents found OIRA oversight of government agencies
desirable and retained it.95 And Congress endorsed OIRA involvement, to some
extent, in the Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995.96 The centralization, however,
has undermined the rule of law even when Presidents more supportive of
government regulation than Reagan won election. For example, President
Obama’s administration held up rules required under statutes for political
reasons, to avoid antagonizing Republican opponents of regulation.97 Thus,
President Obama undermined the rule of law to enhance presidential influence
over future policy, subordinating law to politics.

90. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601(1) (1982).
91. David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335, 376–78 (2006)
(showing that in most cases OIRA review takes place where no CBA has been done and often produces
significant changes having nothing to do with CBA); Claudia O’Brien, White House Review of Regulations
Under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 8 J. ENV’T L. & LITIG. 51, 73 (1993) (suggesting that industry
lobbying and OIRA personnel’s personal views influenced its review more than cost-benefit analysis).
92. David M. Driesen, Thomas M. Keck & Brandon T. Metroka, Half a Century of Supreme Court Clean
Air Act Interpretation: Purposivism, Textualism, Dynamism, and Activism, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781,
1794–95, 1853 (2018); Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1846–48 (2013).
93. See Percival, supra note 88, at 196 (noting that Reagan’s Office of Legal Counsel had insisted that the
order did not displace the relevant agencies in discharging their statutory functions).
94. See, e.g., id. at 175–76 (noting that the Reagan executive order was criticized for displacing agencies
statutory responsibilities and for lengthy delays); Driesen, supra note 91, at 372–73 (discussing cases where rule
changes recommended by OMB caused reversal of agency action in court); Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of
Power: Office of Management & Budget Supervision of Environmental Protection Agency Rulemaking Under
Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J. NAT. RES. L. 1, 26–27 (1984) (providing an example of OMB intervention
causing a statutory violation and suggesting that in general it drives agencies to decisions that illegally rely on
non-statutory factors).
95. Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the President Have Directive Authority over Agency
Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487, 2511–13, 2528–39 (2011) (discussing the Obama and
Clinton executive orders modeled after Reagan’s).
96. Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, § 202(a), 109 Stat. 64 (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 1532
(1995)).
97. Watts, supra note 86, at 699–700 (noting that EPA officials reported being instructed to hold up
proposed rules to avoid controversy prior to the 2012 election).
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President Obama’s administration, in keeping with the trend toward
centralized control, sought to establish his preferred immigration policies
through a policy of nonenforcement of immigration laws against children living
here and immigrant parents of American citizens.98 The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed the policy protecting parents of U.S. citizens as contrary
to the Immigration and Naturalization Act, and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed
that decision by an equally divided vote.99
President Trump built on this legacy to broadly undermine the rule of law.
He put forward a slate of nominees to cabinet positions more systematically and
completely dedicated to undermining the laws than any previous President, and,
with one exception, they sailed through the Senate on lock-step party-line
votes.100 Trump’s EPA administrator—Scott Pruitt—however, proved so
corrupt that Trump removed him under pressure.101 Trump more often has
dismissed or triggered the resignation of officials because they show allegiance
to the rule of law on matters important to him. For example, Trump fired James
Comey—who investigated Russian interference in the 2016 election, Jeffrey
Sessions—who respected conflict of interest rules governing government
attorneys, and Inspector General Mike Atkinson—who complied with a statute
requiring him to report whistleblower complaints to Congress.102 He also
triggered the resignation of Kirstjen Nielsen—who wanted the administration to
follow immigration law offering asylum to refugees fleeing persecution.103
Thus, Trump used his appointment and removal authority to undermine the rule
of law.
Moreover, President Trump promulgated a set of executive orders that
attacked the rule of law, including some that sought to substitute presidential for
legal control over administrative agencies.104 The most sweeping of these orders
attack much of the United States Code, which tasks administrative agencies with
98. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146–48 (5th Cir. 2015) (describing this policy), aff’d sub
nom. 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (mem.).
99. See id. at 186 (finding the DAPA policy “manifestly contrary” to the Immigration and Naturalization
Act).
100. David M. Driesen, President Trump’s Executive Orders and the Rule of Law, 87 UMKC L. REV. 489,
516, 517 n.185 (2019) (noting that then presidential advisor Steve Bannon stated that Trump chose cabinet
members to “deconstruct the administrative state” and that they had backgrounds of opposing the laws they were
supposed to administer).
101. Richard L. Revesz, Institutional Pathologies in the Regulatory State: What Scott Pruitt Taught Us
About Regulatory Policy, 34 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 211, 212 nn.1–4 (2019) (explaining that Scott Pruitt
resigned “after months of controversy and investigations into alleged ethics violations”).
102. Peter Baker, Katie Benner & Michael D. Shear, Jeffrey Sessions Is Forced Out as Attorney General as
Trump Installs Loyalist, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/07/us/politics/
sessions-resigns.html; Charlie Savage, Inspector General Fired by Trump Urges Whistle-Blowers “To Bravely
Speak Up”, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/06/us/politics/michael-atkinsoninspector-general-fired.html; Michael D. Shear & Matt Apuzzo, F.B.I. Director James Comey Is Fired by Trump,
N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/us/politics/james-comey-fired-fbi.html.
103. Zolan Kanno-Youngs, Maggie Haberman, Michael D. Shear & Eric Schmitt, Kirstjen Nielsen Resigns
as Trump’s Homeland Security Secretary, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/04/07/us/politics/kirstjen-nielsen-dhs-resigns.html (explaining that the resignation stemmed from Trump’s
demand that she close the border to asylum seekers, which she found “inappropriate”).
104. See Driesen, supra note 100, at 497–509 (discussing relevant executive orders).
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protecting the public from various kinds of harm, such as financial chicanery,
pollution, occupational hazards, and unsafe products (for example, food, drugs,
and automobiles).105 Trump, in effect, commanded the agencies to faithlessly
execute the law by not protecting people from harms, telling them instead to
protect the businesses they regulate from any net cost.106 He did this by issuing
an executive order instructing all agencies to repeal two rules for every new one
promulgated and to ensure that all the rules changed together impose no net
cost.107 President Trump also instructed the government to undermine the
Affordable Care Act (ACA), directing federal officials to “waive, defer, grant
exemptions from, or delay the implementation” of the ACA’s requirements.108
Notwithstanding the “to the extent permitted by law” caveats (maximum extent
in the ACA context), these orders instruct government agencies to substitute
Trump’s policies for the law’s policies.109
These and other orders substantially undermined the rule of law in much
of the federal government. In their wake, the Trump administration lost an
astonishing 91% of its regulatory cases between the beginning of his
administration and June 25, 2020.110 These cases involve violations of the
Administrative Procedure Act, which requires legal and reasonable decisionmaking and use of procedures permitting public input.111 Normally, the
government wins about 70% of regulatory cases.112 Judicial reversal only
produces remand; it does not secure proper enforcement of regulatory statutes.113
President Trump also incentivized the exodus of about 17,000 civil
servants.114 He triggered this exodus by freezing pay, leaving vacancies unfilled,
creating a work environment hostile to rational discussion of policy, and shutting

105. See id. at 507.
106. Id. at 507–08.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 508–09 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13,765, 3 C.F.R. 260 (2018)).
109. See Gresham v. Azar, 950 F.3d 93, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (invalidating decision to allow Arkansas to
impose work requirements on recipients of Medicaid under the Act’s waiver authority); New York v. U.S. Dep’t
of Lab., 363 F. Supp. 3d 109, 141 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that the Trump Administration’s exemption of many
employer sponsored health plans from ACA regulation effectuates an “end run” around the ACA as directed by
the executive order); California v. Health & Hum. Servs., 351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1284 (9th Cir. 2019) (enjoining
rule creating exemptions to the ACA’s contraception mandate), aff’d sub nom. California v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Hum. Servs., 941 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. granted and judgment vacated sub nom. Dep’t of Health &
Hum. Servs. V. California, No. 19-1038, 2020 WL 3865243 (U.S. July 9, 2020) (mem.).
110. See Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Federal Courts, INST. FOR POL’Y INTEGRITY, N.Y.U.,
https://policyintegrity.org/trump-court-roundup (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
111. Revesz, supra note 101, at 213 (Trump’s losses stem from failure “to take required procedural steps,
such as” adequately “explaining its reasoning or allowing for public comment”).
112. Id.
113. See Baez-Sanchez v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1033, 1035, 1037 (7th Cir. 2020) (discussing a rare case of outright
defiance of a remand order but noting that even after a remand the government may follow its contrary policy
in another case).
114. Lisa Rein, Robert Costa & Danielle Paquette, Shutdown Gives Some Trump Advisers What They’ve
Long Wanted: Smaller Government, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/nationpolitics/shutdown-gives-some-trump-advisers-what-theyve-long-wanted-smaller-government/ (Jan. 16, 2019,
9:28 AM).
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down the federal government.115 I am not aware of any studies examining
whether these moves, which some small government advocates support, have
contributed to the decline of the rule of law. Legislative decisions to repeal
regulatory statutes or abolish government agencies, while distressing to liberals,
conform to the rule of law. Disabling the law by securing the resignation of
people dedicated to carrying out laws remaining on the books harms the rule of
law. And a President operating under a unitary executive theory can, over time,
replace all officials inclined to follow the laws with quislings dedicated to
carrying out his orders, at least with the connivance of a loyal Senate.116
C. THE ACADEMIC DEBATE
The academic debate has focused mainly on the original intent of the
Founders and on domestic constitutional custom, not on experience with loss of
democracy before or after the Founding. This review of the debate will focus on
a few key elements of original intent and administrative practice, as an
exhaustive review of all the arguments involved would require a separate article.
Academic supporters of the unitary executive theory, many of them former
Scalia clerks, have elaborated and defended Scalia’s claims. Steven Calabresi
and Saikrishna Prakash have argued that the Constitution creates a “hierarchical
executive branch” under presidential control administering all federal laws.117
They derive this proposition from the existence of three separate branches of
government and the combination of the Vesting Clause—which grants the
President executive power—and the Take Care Clause—requiring the President
to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Thus, they rely on a structural
and textual argument about original intent.
The structural argument warmly embraces separation of powers at the
expense of checks and balances.118 Calabresi and Prakash argue that the
Constitution puts the executive branch under presidential control, just as it places
legislation under the control of Congress and the judicial branch under the
control of the courts.119 But the Constitution’s text plainly refutes the notion that
the entities at the head of the various branches of government enjoy exclusive
control over their branches’ operation. Congress has complete control over
which courts other than the Supreme Court shall exist, and almost limitless

115. See id.
116. Cf. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 523 (2014) (noting that the purpose of
Senatorial confirmation was to prevent appointment based on presidential “favoritism” leading to appointment
of “unfit” nominees personally attached to the President).
117. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 549–50 (claiming that the historical evidence overwhelmingly
supports their textualist case for “a hierarchical executive branch under the control of the President”).
118. See generally Strauss, Place of Agencies, supra note 3, at 577–78 (contrasting separation of powers
with checks and balances).
119. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 544, 566 (advocating a “‘high school civics’ conception” of
separation of powers where Congress controls the legislative power, the judiciary controls the judicial power,
and the President alone controls the “executive power”).
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control over the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction.120 While Congress has
legislative authority, so does the President, as he can veto legislation.121
The Constitution does not leave the executive branch unchecked by other
branches of government under the Constitution either. The text pointedly denies
the President sole control over either appointment or removal of officers of the
executive branch.
The Appointments Clause does not allow him to appoint a single cabinet
member without the Senate’s approval.122 It allows Congress to remove “Inferior
Officers” from presidential control, by expressly authorizing Congress to assign
their appointment to the judicial branch.123 This strongly suggests the lack of a
strict hierarchy of control. The Appointments Clause also permits Congress to
vest appointment power for inferior offices in the head of a department or the
President.124 But the choice of whether to provide for presidential control or
influence over the appointment of inferior officers generally lies with
Congress.125
The Constitution contains only one Removal Clause—the clause
authorizing the Senate to remove federal officials upon impeachment by the
House.126 And that Clause empowers Congress to remove officials of the federal
government from office, not the President. Thus, no express constitutional
authority supports the idea of any presidential authority for removal, although
the custom has certainly evolved since the Founding, even before Myers.127
Alexander Hamilton explained in the Federalist Papers that the
Constitution provides for “stability of the administration” because the Senate’s
approval would be required in order to remove an executive officer.128 It is not
entirely clear whether Hamilton’s insistence that the President lacks the power
to remove federal officials unilaterally relies on the exclusivity of the
Constitution’s Removal Clause or the principle that the power of removal goes
with the power of appointment (which the Senate shares). But Hamilton
defended the Constitution’s denial of unilateral presidential control over
120. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 cl. 2; Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506, 513 (1868) (noting that the
Constitution expressly grants the Congress power to limit the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction). But cf.
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146 (1871) (holding that Congress may not promulgate a rule deciding cases
pending before the Court).
121. See Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 438–39 (1988) (describing the provision authorizing
a veto).
122. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673–77 (1988) (recognizing that Article II expressly authorizes
Congress to choose whether to lodge appointment of an inferior officer in the judiciary, but suggesting that
separation of powers principles may occasionally limit this power).
126. Accord id. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that the only express provision in the
Constitution authorizing removal of an executive officer is the clause authorizing the Senate to remove an officer
upon impeachment).
127. Cf. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2225 (2020) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(ignoring the Senate’s removal authority in cases of impeachment and stating that “nothing” in the constitutional
text “speaks of removal”).
128. THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
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executive branch officials as promoting a stable rule of law, rather than a rule of
presidential personality:
A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so
violent or so general a revolution in the officers of the government as
might be expected, if he were the sole disposer of offices. Where a
man in any station had given satisfactory evidence of his fitness for
it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in
favor of a person more agreeable to him, by the apprehension that a
discountenance of the Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring
some degree of discredit upon himself.129

The endorsement of retaining competent officers and the rejection of
replacing them with new politically aligned officials reflects the disinterested
leadership thinking at the founding—the widely held view that all objective,
reasonable officials would agree upon the proper course of action.130 And the
reference to the President as the “Chief Magistrate,” a locution found throughout
the Federalist Papers, suggests that the Framers viewed the President’s role as a
more modest one than the dramatic role he plays today.131 They sought to avoid
autocracy by establishing a rule of law rooted in a set of duties, checks, and
balances.132
The requirement of a congressional role in removal also reinforces the
values Hamilton articulated with respect to the reasons that the Constitution
denies the President sole control over appointments. As Hamilton put it, the
Senate’s advice and consent role discourages the President from nominating
candidates “personally allied to him, or . . . possessing the necessary
insignificance and pliancy to render them the obsequious instruments of his
pleasure.”133 This statement suggests that the Framers did not envision or
support an attitude of compliance with presidential will, thereby casting doubt
on the political dimension of the unitary executive theory and the supposition
that the Constitution embraces fear-based presidential domination, as suggested
by the Seila Law Court.
Hamilton’s statements rejecting unilateral presidential removal authority
appeared in the Federalist Papers, written to influence those considering
129. Id.
130. See GLENN A. PHELPS, GEORGE WASHINGTON AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 81 (1993)
(describing George Washington’s belief in a single public interest to which all men of good will would
subscribe); GORDON S. WOOD, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: A HISTORY 165 (2002) (discussing the Framers’
“vision of disinterested leadership”); David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 103–04 (2009) (explaining that the Framer’s envisioned disinterested leadership, not a
President shaping law execution to reflect the preferences of a political faction).
131. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 18, 66, 68–74, 77 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 39, 47, 48 (James Madison),
NOS. 3–4 (John Jay).
132. See Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 579 (2014) (Scalia J., concurring) (noting that
the Founders viewed the Senate’s role in appointments as a “critical protection against despotism” (citing Freytag
v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 883 (1991))).
133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton); Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd., 573 U.S. at 523 (majority
opinion) (citing Alexander Hamilton’s statements that Senate approval provides a “check upon a spirit of
favoritism in the President”).
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ratification of the Constitution. Since original intent properly focuses on the
intent of “We the People” who adopted the Constitution, Framers’ statements
that likely informed the Ratifiers’ decision merit special respect.134
The political dimension of the unitary executive theory smuggles
twentieth-century notions of presidential political power into an eighteenthcentury document seeking to create a magistrate.135 We now look at the
President as the leader of a political party establishing a policy program for the
entire federal government.136 This reflects not original intent, but the
proliferation of broad delegation of quasi-legislative authority to the executive
branch, the rising political force of the presidency because of mass
communication, the emergence of the United States as a world power, and the
President’s role as leader of a political party.137 The Framers, far from seeking
to empower the President to implement his party’s policy preferences, sought to
avoid the creation of “factions.”138 They viewed the Chief Magistrate’s role as
one of faithfully superintending efforts to carry out policies reflecting the
preferences of Congress, not the political preferences of the “chief magistrate,”
even though they understood that administration of law requires exercise of
some discretion.
The originalist argument for the unitary executive theory also must grapple
with the Framers’ rejection of Alexander Hamilton’s unitarian proposal at the
Philadelphia Convention. He and other proponents of executive power proposed
that the President have the power to appoint all executive officers “at pleasure,”
meaning that the President could both appoint them and remove them at will.139
The Framers rejected this proposal in favor of the “skillfully contrived” (in
Hamilton’s words) checks and balances now found in the Constitution’s
Appointment and Removal Clauses.140 They did this because many of the

134. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 552 (stating that originalism properly focuses on the
constitutional text as “understood by the people who enacted or ratified” it (emphasis added)).
135. Driesen, supra note 130, at 83 (arguing that the unitary executive theory smuggles modern notions of
expansive presidential power into the Constitution).
136. See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (discussing the tendency of the public to focus its “hopes and expectations” for the country on the
President in light of the “drama, magnitude, and finality” of his decisions).
137. See id. at 653–54 (explaining that the President’s role as leader of a political party, his “access to the
public mind through modern” communication methods, his “prestige as head of state,” and “vast accretions of
federal power” have magnified the President’s power in the years since the founding).
138. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton) (expressing “horror and disgust” at the history of
faction and insurrection in Greece and Italy); THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (characterizing faction
as a “dangerous vice”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 77 (Alexander Hamilton) (praising the stability encouraged by the
Constitution’s denial of a presidential removal authority).
139. See Driesen, supra note 130, at 98–99 (explaining that the Framers rejected sole presidential control
over appointment and removal as it would lead to monarchy); 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION of
1787, at 233–35, 342–43 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) (1911).
140. See 22 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION BY THE STATES, NEW YORK 1953 (John P. Kaminski, Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler,
Charles H. Schoenleber & Margaret A. Hogan eds., 1976) (statement of Alexander Hamilton) (describing the
Constitution as eschewing a pure system of separation of powers in favor of incorporation of “all the checks
which the greatest politicians and the best writers have ever conceived,” to thwart “wicked measure[s]”).
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Founders feared that sole presidential control over the executive branch would
lead to monarchy.141
Edward Corwin pointed out decades ago that the New York Constitution
contained Take Care and Vesting Clauses precisely mirroring the U.S.
Constitution’s clauses, but did not allow the Governor to either appoint or
remove officers, vesting those functions in a council.142 Several scholars have
also pointed out that the Oath Clause requires executive branch officials to swear
an oath to obey the Constitution, reflecting the Framers’ conscious decision to
reject the European tradition of swearing allegiance to the head of state.143 As a
result, all federal officials must disobey illegal presidential orders, even if they
reflect the President’s will.144 Scholars have argued that reading the Vesting and
Take Care Clauses as giving the President sole control over the executive branch
of government does not provide a plausible reading of the whole Constitution’s
text in light of the Appointments Clause, the Removal Clause, the Oath Clause,
and numerous other clauses.145 Justice Jackson made a similar point in
Youngstown, when he explained that a broad construction of the Vesting Clause
as embracing royal prerogative was incompatible with the need to have explicit
constitutional clauses granting the President the right to commission members
of the armed forces and to get opinions from the heads of executive
departments.146
While a few scholars have engaged the unitarians on their own originalist
terms, most of the theory’s opponents have not. Instead, most opponents have
argued that whatever the original understanding, constitutional practice has from
141. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 17 (2000) (pointing out that a number of delegates objected to allowing the President
alone to appoint executive officers, because “it would lead to monarchy”). But see ERIC NELSON, THE ROYALIST
REVOLUTION: MONARCHY AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 1, 7, 22, 110–11 (2014) (showing that some of the
Framers supported a strong executive and feared a tyrannical legislature).
142. EDWARD S. CORWIN, CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THOUGHT, THE POWERS OF CONGRESS, AND THE PRESIDENT’S POWER OF
REMOVAL 354 (Richard Loss ed., Cornell U. Press 1981) (1948) (explaining that in spite of a Vesting Clause
and a Take Care Clause in New York’s Constitution, its governor had “very little voice in either appointments
or removals”); see Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2228 (2020) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (citing Corwin for this point).
143. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; THE FEDERALIST NO. 27 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that the
“sanctity” of the oath will bind all officers of the government to obey federal law); Enid Campbell, Oaths and
Affirmations of Public Office Under English Law: An Historical Retrospect, 21 J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 1–2 (2000)
(detailing the history of oaths of office in England); Driesen, supra note 130, at 84–87 (analyzing the Oath
Clause); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 18 (1984) (describing the Oath
Clause as establishing allegiance to the Constitution in much the same way as religious oaths aim to establish
fidelity to a religion).
144. See Driesen, supra note 130, at 85–86.
145. See id. at 83–96 (engaging in a detailed intertextual analysis); Michael A. Froomkin, Note, In Defense
of Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 YALE L.J. 787, 799–801 (1987); see also Robert V. Percival,
Presidential Management of the Administrative State: The Not-So-Unitary Executive, 51 DUKE L.J. 963, 967–
69 (2001) (offering a brief textualist argument for limited presidential power).
146. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640–41, 641 n.9 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (rejecting the view that the Vesting Clause grants the President “all the executive powers of which
the Government is capable” as incompatible with explicit grants of “trifling” authorities, such as the authority
to get opinions from department heads and commission members of the armed forces).
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the beginning to the present day involved a variety of power-sharing
arrangements with respect to administration, including quasi-private
corporations, independent prosecutors, independent agencies, a merit-based
civil service, and the like.147 They suggest that these arrangements serve the rule
of law well by creating forces tending to foster legal compliance and a dialogue
between experts and elected politicians about wise policy.148
D. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSTRUING THE CONSTITUTION TO PRESERVE THE
REPUBLIC
The foregoing material establishes, at least, that the available information
does not make an overwhelming originalist case for the unitary executive theory,
which may help explain why Seila Law produced a 5-4 decision.149 While the
unitary executive theory offers a fairly natural construction of the Vesting and
Take Care Clauses in isolation, it stands in considerable tension with many other
provisions in the Constitution, statements of the Framers that likely influenced
many of the Constitution’s ratifiers, and the history of the Constitution’s
drafting. Nor is it an inevitable construction of the Vesting and Take Care
Clauses, as New York’s Constitution demonstrates. The Constitution does not
require the President to execute the law faithfully, but only to “take care” that it
be faithfully executed.150 The “take care” locution suggests not exercise of
unbridled authority, but rather an effort to get others who implement the law to
do so properly.151 The passive voice in the Clause (“be faithfully executed”)
indicates that people other than the President would often execute the law,
because even in George Washington’s time, presidential execution of all law by

147. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Firing U.S. Attorneys: An Essay, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 707, 708 n.3 (2008)
(discussing the U.S. tradition of prosecutorial independence); Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the
President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L. REV. 1, 38–74 (2018) (discussing prosecutorial
independence and its history); Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9–10 (1994) (noting that the early practice of the new republic did not create a hierarchy
under tight presidential control); Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist
Foundations, 1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1303–04 (2006) (discussing the establishment of private
corporations and other institutions independent of presidential control during the founding era); Shugerman,
supra note 50, at 125, 128 (discussing the norm of DOJ autonomy and its roots in the practice of decentralized
prosecution in the early republic); Strauss, Place of Agencies, supra note 3, at 583–86 (discussing the role of
administrative agencies in modern government).
148. See, e.g., PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 121–32 (2009); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 321–22 (2006) (arguing that delegation of powers to administrative agencies tends to
support the rule of law by countering presidential tendencies to go beyond statutory authority).
149. Accord HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 145–161 (2015); Heidi Kitrosser, Interpretive Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459, 504–13
(2016).
150. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
151. Accord Driesen, supra note 130, at 83–84 (explaining that the Take Care Clause requires the President
to attempt to secure proper law enforcement from others); Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean
Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1835, 1836 (2016) (noting that the Take Care Clause’s language suggests
“some sort of [presidential] duty” to “get those who execute the law” to “act with some sort of fidelity”).
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the President personally was impossible, and it certainly is impossible now.152
Justice Roberts acknowledged this point in his Seila Law majority opinion.153
Reading the web of compromises embedded in the Constitution as embodying
an unstated agreement on something as fine-grained as for-cause removal seems
quite problematic, as the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention barely agreed
on a Constitution at all, and it scarcely survived the ratification process partly
out of anxiety about presidential power.154
But some features of the original understanding germane to the unitary
executive theory are not controversial. The Framers sought to establish a “rule
of law.”155 While the idea of the “rule of law” has become an integral part of our
understanding of democracy, its precise contours excite controversy. Still, our
history does flesh out its basic contours. The rule of law means that the whims
of a single person do not determine the course of government action. The
Declaration of Independence complains about arbitrary executive action,
including the King’s tendency to protect his friends and harshly punish his
opponents (a characteristic of centralized autocratic government highlighted in
the next part).156 As Julian Mortensen exhaustively demonstrates, the
Constitution gives the President executive powers in order to execute laws
passed by Congress.157 Thus, the rule of law contains the principle of legislative
supremacy, expressed in the Constitution with the long list of congressional
powers in Article I, section 8.158
A rule of law, however, envisions more than just a set of rules that might
provide a source of power for an autocrat. China and Russia have laws, but
almost no one thinks that they have a rule of law.159 The rule of law means that

152. Driesen, supra note 130, at 83 (noting the impossibility even in George Washington’s time for the
President to execute all law by himself); Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 151, at 1836 (linking the Take Care
Clause’s passive voice to the idea that it imposes a duty for the President to get others to properly implement the
law); Gillian E. Metzger, The Constitutional Duty to Supervise, 124 YALE L.J. 1836, 1875–76 (2015) (noting
that the Take Care Clause’s passive voice indicates that others beside the President implement the law and that
any other result is impossible).
153. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020).
154. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
213–56 (2016) (discussing the Framers’ struggle to reconcile their competing views and interests and their fear
that too strong a presidency would lead to a failure to obtain ratification); PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE
PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION 1787–1788, at 46–49 (2010) (discussing leading antifederalists’ fear of the
powers of the President and Senate and Randolph’s fears that the People would reject the Constitution as
drafted).
155. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (describing the Constitution’s purpose as
to secure a “government of laws, and not of men”).
156. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 641 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(finding a broad construction of the Vesting Clause incompatible with the Declaration of Independence’s
rejection of King George’s royal prerogatives).
157. Julian Davis Mortenson, Article II Vests the Executive Power, Not the Royal Prerogative, 119 COLUM.
L. REV. 1169, 1169, 1269–71 (2019).
158. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
159. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 3 (2004) (quoting a
Chinese law professor as saying that “Chinese leaders want rule by law, not rule of law”).
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law limits not just the ruled, but also the rulers.160 Hence, the Constitution aims
to make the President and the rest of the executive branch servants of the policies
Congress enacts into law.161 The idea of faithfulness in the Take Care Clause
connotes faith to somebody or something outside oneself.162 Thus, faithful
execution of the law means execution faithful to the policy decisions of the
enacting Congress.163 This ideal of the rule of law lies behind the stability
referenced in Hamilton’s statements in the Federalist period and the Framers’
hatred of faction. For laws enacted by Congress might remain in place for a long
time and faithfulness to the Constitution would mean that each successive
President would seek to realize the law’s objectives, whether the “Chief
Magistrate” agrees with them or not.164
The rule of law also implies equal treatment under the law. The law applies
to all, regardless of their political views or identity.165 If the government only
enforces the law against its opponents, no rule of law exists.166 While the
purpose animating the law appears to govern, law applied only to regime
opponents simply masks arbitrary authority. While the precise scope and
operation of equal treatment under the law changes over time and is open to
debate, the existence of the basic principle constitutes an essential element of
the rule of law.
Finally, the rule of law implies limits on government power to protect
individual liberty, an idea expressed in our bill of rights.167 While all western
democracies protect a set of individual rights, the precise scope and nature of the
rights protected varies across polities.
The rule of law constitutes an essential component of democracy under our
Constitution and the constitutions of subsequent democracies. The People elect
legislators to enact the laws governing the society, and these elected officials
must use their judgment about what laws work best, subjecting themselves to
periodic elections so that the People may remove legislators who oppose needed
laws or support improvident legislation. The People also elect the President
because the proper superintendence of the law constitutes an important function,
and faithless execution can lead to tyranny.

160. See id. at 114–15 (saying that a broad understanding of the rule of law for over two thousand years
includes the idea that the law limits the sovereign power).
161. See Driesen, supra note 130, at 72–73 (arguing that the Founders aimed to secure “allegiance to the
[rule of] law in all executive branch officials” and to have the President generally cede policymaking authority
to Congress).
162. See Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 151, at 1857 (noting that the word “faithfully” suggests some
kind of “fidelity”).
163. See id. at 1855–58 (suggesting that at a minimum the Take Care Clause indicates a duty to seek proper
implementation of statutes).
164. See Driesen, supra note 130, at 102–03 (explaining that the Founders sought legal stability, not
government by presidential preference).
165. See TAMANAHA, supra note 159, at 116 (discussing the assumption that the law applies to “everyone”).
166. See id. at 122 (associating the rule of law ideal with shielding individuals from the passions and
prejudices of those administering the law).
167. See id. at 118 (discussing the idea of a set of human rights limiting the sovereign power as an aspect of
the rule of law).
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This last point proves crucial. The Founders of this country could barely
agree on the specifics of a Constitution. But they all agreed that they wanted to
create a republic with the means of surviving the challenges that might destroy
it. The Framers had studied the demise of previous republics and strove to
prevent a repeat.168 And they recognized the danger of “despotism,” that the head
of state might one day threaten the republic’s survival.169
The intent to preserve the republic from the dangers of despotism should
guide construction of the scope of presidential power today.170 It constitutes not
just an institutional arrangement that the Founders barely agreed upon, but an
essential widely agreed purpose of the entire process of framing and then
ratifying our Constitution.171
Youngstown provides support for this mode of constitutional construction,
as it animates many of the Justices’ opinions.172 Justice Douglas’ concurring
opinion quotes the Brandeis dissent from Myers, which advocated construing
the Constitution to “save the people from autocracy.”173 The same passage links
this
republic
preservation
principle
to
construction
that
“preclude[s] . . . arbitrary power” even at the expense of executive branch
efficiency.174 The Douglas opinion associates efficient executive power with the
“reign of ancient kings” and “rule of modern dictators.”175
Justices Jackson and Frankfurter, who embraced broader views of
presidential power than Justice Douglas, likewise construed executive power to
preserve the republic (based on the experience of democracy loss abroad).
Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion, which scholars often treat as establishing
the guiding framework for deciding issues of presidential power,176 expressly
relies on the Framers’ intent to preserve a republic in supporting a construction
of the Constitution that did not allow the President to seize steel mills in support
of an ongoing war effort (in Korea). After laying out his influential tripartite
framework, which made congressional attitude toward asserted presidential
power important in resolving questions about that power’s scope, he rejected the
168. See EVERDELL, supra note 14, at 150–70 (discussing the Founders’ study of ancient history in order to
understand how to avoid loss of the republic).
169. See Richard H. Pildes, Law and the President, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1417 (2012) (describing the
culture at the founding as “deeply fearful” of monarchy) (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE
EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010)).
170. Cf. Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69, 71 (2009) (noting that the
“Democracy Canon” in election law has enjoyed long and broad support in state courts dating back to the 1800s).
171. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121, 125 (1866) (stating that the Founders were aware of the history
of rulers resisting restraints on their power and designed the Constitution to prevent “anarchy and despotism”
even under the pressure of war).
172. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
173. See id. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
174. See id. (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)) (the Constitution’s doctrine of
separation of powers aimed “not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary authority”).
175. See id.
176. Cf. Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV. L. REV. 112, 115
(2015) (describing “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite framework” as sanctified in the law reviews even though
the Supreme Court has only deployed it in four cases).
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view that the Vesting Clause grants the President “all the executive powers of
which the government is capable.”177 He analogized such broad presidential
power to the executive powers enjoyed by “totalitarian” governments.178 He
rejected the claim for implied power, even in the face of an emergency,
explaining that granting the President of Germany emergency powers led to the
end of the Weimar Republic.179 He then insists that the Constitution must be
construed to preserve the republic, stating that “emergency powers are consistent
with free government” only when their control is lodged outside of the executive
branch.180
In deciding whether to construe the Constitution to grant the President
emergency powers, Jackson took into account the possible threat of increased
presidential power to free government in light of its growth through the time of
decision. His opinion discusses the rise of presidential power through the
President’s emergence as a party leader and the growth of the President’s
authority and prestige owing to the emergence of mass communication.181 It then
concludes that the country will not “suffer if the Court refuses further to
aggrandize the presidential office, already so potent and so relatively immune
from judicial review, at the expense of Congress.”182 And he insisted on
interpreting the Constitution to limit the President’s power in order to maintain
the rule of law.183 In the last line of his opinion, he declared it the duty of the
Court to preserve the rule of law.184
Justice Frankfurter’s influential concurring opinion in Youngstown
likewise supports the principle of construing the Constitution to preserve the
republic in light of history abroad. His opinion begins by affirming that our
democracy requires a “reign of reason,” which one might contrast with a rule of
presidential will.185 He then argued that the experience of Nazi Germany affirms
the Framers’ wisdom in insisting on a system of “checks and balances.”186 He
rejected the theory that we enjoy “immunities from the hazards of concentrated
power” and embraced the Founders’ study of “the experience of man” (in other

177. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640–41 (Jackson, J., concurring) (finding that view difficult to square
with inclusion of specific trifling executive powers in the Constitution).
178. See id. at 641 (noting a match between the “executive powers in those governments we disparagingly
describe as totalitarian” and the royal prerogative that the Founders rejected).
179. See id. at 651 (granting the President the right to exercise emergency powers led to their invocation on
more than 250 occasions and finally the permanent suspension of rights under Adolf Hitler).
180. Id. at 652.
181. See id. at 653–54.
182. Id. at 654.
183. See id. at 654–55 (describing the governance of the “impersonal forces which we call law” as the
“essence of our free Government”).
184. See id. at 655 (stating that even though the institution of a government of laws “may be destined to
pass away,” “it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give them up”).
185. See id. at 593 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
186. Id. (explaining that “the experience through which the world has passed in our own day has made
vivid” the Framers’ wisdom in building a structure of government based on “checks and balances”).
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countries), which showed the need for “limitations on the power of governors
over the governed.”187
Justice Black’s majority opinion more subtly alludes to the principle of
republic preservation at the end of his opinion by referencing the “fears of
power” that lay behind the Founders’ decision to “entrust[] the lawmaking
power to the Congress alone.”188 Justice Black, however, placed much less
emphasis on this principle than the concurring Justices, because he saw the
formal limits on presidential power as making Youngstown a simple case.189

II. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE ABROAD: LESSONS FROM DEMOCRATIC
EROSION IN TURKEY, HUNGARY, AND POLAND
This Part offers case studies of democratic erosion in Turkey, Hungary, and
Poland to illustrate the role that head-of-state control of the executive branch
plays in undermining the rule of law and democracy. All three of these countries,
when they enjoyed a constitutional democracy, employed administrative
arrangements protecting the independence of the civil service, the prosecutorial
service, and important state agencies vital to maintaining a democracy, such as
the electoral commissions and media authorities. While precise institutional
arrangements vary, around the world functioning democracies rely on
independence for prosecution services and other agencies vital to democracy to
ensure a robust rule of law.190
In Turkey, Hungary, and Poland, however, the head-of-state, with the
backing of his political party, changed the constitutional order by creating
centralization, functionally similar to that called for by the unitary executive
theory.191 In all of these cases, and many more, centralized control undermined
the rule of law and democracy. Indeed, one might define autocracy, at least in
part, as a regime where the head of state exercises effective political control of
the administration of law, rather than relying primarily on reasonably
independent administration. Elections continue to take place, as they do in China
and Russia, but the authoritarian leader and his party enjoy a vice-grip on

187. See id.
188. See id. at 589 (majority opinion) (“It would do no good to recall the historical events, the fears of
power, and the hopes for freedom that lay behind [the Founders’] choice” to “entrust[] the lawmaking power to
the Congress alone in both good and bad times.”).
189. See id. at 585–88 (holding the President’s seizure of steel mills unconstitutional, because that action
did not execute a law passed by Congress nor constitute an exercise of commander-in-chief authority).
190. See TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ, HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 102–07 (2018)
(explaining how independent bureaucracies tend to support democracy).
191. In Poland, the head of the Law and Justice Party (called by the Polish acronym PiS)—Jaroslaw
Kaczyński— serves as a de facto head of state, even though he does not personally serve as Prime Minister or
President. See WOJCIECH SADURSKI, POLAND’S CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN 14–15 (2019) (noting that even
although Poland employs anti-communist rhetoric, it follows a communist model of government in having the
head of a party serve as de facto head of state); Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Anthony
Levitas—What Is Happening in Poland and Why it Matters (Again), YOUTUBE (May 6, 2016),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rao7f0Q0OlU (showing that 57% of Poles consider Kaczyński the most
powerful person in Poland, whilst only 17% think that the Prime Minister or the President is the most powerful
person).
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national power in Hungary, Turkey, and other autocracies that has become very
difficult to break.192
This process takes time. The literature on democratic backsliding
emphasizes that a process of erosion taking place over a decade or more can
destroy democracy, just as a sudden coup would.193 While establishing
centralized control over the executive branch of government plays a crucial role
in establishing autocracy, the elected autocrats destroying democracy also
capture courts and rely on party-line lockstep voting to end deliberative
democracy based on parliamentary compromises.194 While the political factors
leading to these institutional changes vary, partisan division plays a leading role
in loss of democracy across many polities and across time.195
A. ESTABLISHING CENTRALIZED CONTROL IN TURKEY, HUNGARY, AND
POLAND
While all three autocrats undermined independent administration, the most
radical example of creation of centralized administration undermining the rule
of law comes from Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became Turkey’s Prime
Minister in 2002.196 After a decade of amassing personal power, he obtained a
constitutional amendment converting Turkey to a presidentialist system and
became President in 2014.197 In 2017, he secured enactment of Russian-style
constitutional amendments to entrench himself firmly in control of the
government, primarily by creating personal power over the executive branch
through a tainted referendum passed after using emergency powers to suppress
civil liberties in the wake of a failed 2016 coup attempt against his
government.198 The amendments give the Turkish President the authority to

192. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 547 (2018) (the new autocrats
create a “superficial appearance” of democracy because elections continue). Political scientists sometimes refer
to this style of authoritarianism as “competitive authoritarianism.” See STEVEN LEVITSKY & LUCAN A. WAY,
COMPETITIVE AUTHORITARIANISM: HYBRID REGIMES AFTER THE COLD WAR 3 (2010).
193. See Huq & Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 83–84 (distinguishing between sudden collapse of democracy
and “constitutional retrogression” where competitive elections, rights of speech and association, and the rule of
law decay substantially over time); Scheppele, supra note 192, at 555 (it takes “more than a decade . . . before
the pretense of democratic . . . government disappears entirely”).
194. See Scheppele, supra note 192, at 549–50 (discussing the Hungarian autocrat’s attack on the
independence of “crucial institutions, such as the media, the prosecutor’s office, the tax authority, and the
election commission” as an example of the new authoritarianism).
195. See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 190, at 83–90 (giving numerous examples of partisan degradation—
polarization leading political parties to try and game the rules protecting fair electoral competition); STEVEN
LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 220–22 (2018) (citing “extreme partisan division” as
the biggest threat to American democracy and noting that such division destroyed Chilean democracy); DANIEL
ZIBLATT, CONSERVATIVE PARTIES AND THE BIRTH OF DEMOCRACY, at xii (2017) (stating that that democracies
require “pragmatic conservative parties” and that their capture by “ferocious right-wing” populists can make
democracy “fragile”).
196. Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism in Turkey, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 339,
347 (Mark A. Graber, Sanford Levison & Mark Tushnet eds., 2018).
197. Ella George, Purges and Paranoia, LONDON REV. BOOKS (May 24, 2018), https://www.lrb.co.uk/thepaper/v40/n10/ella-george/purges-and-paranoia.
198. Varol, supra note 196, at 350–53.
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“unilaterally appoint and remove all cabinet members and heads of all
administrative agencies,” giving him precisely the power that unitarians most
clearly advocate.199 The amendments allow him to appoint half of the members
of the Constitutional Court, the Council of State (Turkey’s highest
administrative court), the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, and the
Higher Education Council.200 They combine these formidable powers with an
authority to issue executive orders that have the force of law on all “subjects
necessary to execute the law,” thereby making the unitarians’ view that the
President can make all executive policy decisions a key part of the Turkish
Constitution.201
Erdoğan removed some 135,000 civil servants from their positions during
a two-year state of emergency following the 2016 coup attempt.202 This attack
on the civil service accelerated the establishment of presidential control over
administration, which Erdoğan had pursued diligently for many years prior to
the coup and solidified with the 2017 referendum.
Viktor Orbán, who destroyed Hungarian democracy over a decade,
similarly consolidated power by taking control of prosecution, the bureaucracy
overseeing the media, the electoral commission, and the taxation authority
during his decade in power.203 He “removed opposition figures and neutral
experts from public institutions.”204 To accomplish this, he had his party, Fidesz,
amend the labor law protecting the civil service, implementing the key reform
advocated by unitarians—provision for at-will removal of government
employees.205 With that accomplished, “critics of the Hungarian government”
began to lose “their jobs at an astonishing rate.”206
Poland’s Peace and Justice Party (PiS) likewise consolidated its leader’s
power by giving Poland’s de facto head of state, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, control
over prosecution, the media regulatory authority, the electoral commission, and
the taxation authority. Kaczyński also gutted the civil service. Article 153 of
Poland’s Constitution requires a “professional” civil service to
“ensure . . . impartial and politically neutral” administration.207 Poland’s
Constitutional Tribunal has interpreted this provision as requiring statutory
procedures to prevent any political interference in the civil service and therefore
required a recruitment process based on objective criteria “free from suspicion

199. Id. at 350.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See Bican Şahin, Two Understandings of Law: Hayek vs. Schmitt in the Context of Turkey, 18 TURKISH
STUD. 556, 569 (2017).
203. See Scheppele, supra note 192, at 549–50.
204. Id. at 550.
205. See id. at 575–76 n.105; cf. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 1, at 1166 (identifying the contention that
the “President has unlimited power to remove . . . principal officers (and perhaps [under this certain approach]
inferior officers)” as the “weakest” unitary executive model).
206. Scheppele, supra note 192, at 575–76 n.105.
207. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND (Apr. 2, 1997), chap. VI, art. 153 (Pol.).
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of partisan bias.”208 Nevertheless, Kaczyński’s government rammed a civil
service act enhancing political control of the civil service through Parliament
shortly after it took office.209 The new civil service act provides for at-will
removal, exemption of the top posts from an open competitive process, and
lessening or eliminating requirements for experience.210 This law, in
combination with others, paved the way for the Kaczyński government to sack
more than 11,000 civil servants, many of which it regards as “enemies of the
state.”211
Kim Lane Scheppele explains that the new autocrats—such as Orbán,
Kaczyński, and Erdoğan (until recently)—generally avoid gross, massive, and
violent human rights violations in favor of using economic repression to
consolidate their power and control opposition.212 The creation of centralized
control over the executive branch plays a key role in jump-starting this process.
Firing civil servants in large numbers sends a powerful message that opposing
the government can imperil one’s livelihood. The Orbán government amplified
this message by pressuring private firms to fire opponents of the regime,
primarily by signaling that firms must cast out dissidents to obtain state
contracts.213 Firing government officials and economic repression create fear,
which makes it easier to create further impediments to opposing the regime.
B. CENTRALIZATION UNDERMINING THE RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY
Bearing in mind that removing public servants from government can pave
the way for establishing a generalized climate of fear useful for establishing an
autocracy, the material below focuses on how the leader’s control over the
prosecutor’s office, the media authority, and the electoral commission advances
autocracy. This narrow institutional focus facilitates a cogent look at the links
between the creation of central control of administration and the key substantive
elements creating an autocracy—impairing the rule of law, reducing electoral
competition, and shrinking the public space—without the distraction of an
overly complex discussion of all agencies that might help achieve those
objectives or help create autocracy through other means.214
1. Centralized Prosecution Sidelining Opponents, Shrinking the Public

208. FRANK BOLD, BRIEFING ON THE POLISH CIVIL SERVICE ACT: RISK OF POLITICIZATION IN POLISH CIVIL
SERVICE 2 (2016), https://en.frankbold.org/sites/default/files/tema/briefing-risk_of_politicizatin_in_polish_
civil_service-2016-03-24.pdf.
209. Beata Springer, Vicious Cycle. A 20 Years’ Perspective on the Changes in the Civil Service Model, in
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE IN POLAND IN COMPARISON WITH INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE
109, 114–19 (Jolanta Itrich-Drabarek, Stanisław Mazur & Justyna Wiśniewska-Grzelak eds., 2018).
210. Id.
211. SADURSKI, supra note 191, at 137.
212. Scheppele, supra note 192, at 575.
213. Id. at 575–76 n.105.
214. See GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 190, at 105–19 (discussing erosion of the rule of law “shrinking the
public sphere” and impairing electoral competition as key elements of democratic decline).
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Space, and Undermining the Rule of Law
These new autocrats, like the old ones, compromise the prosecutors’
independence and assert political control over the prosecutor’s office. When this
happens, prosecutors become useful instruments in undermining the rule of law
and democracy.
In Hungary, Orbán secured the resignation of a respected chief public
prosecutor, possibly by blackmail.215 Orbán then replaced him and his
subordinates with Fidesz loyalists. Through constitutional amendment, Fidesz
put itself (and therefore Orbán) in charge of selecting the chief prosecutor, by
getting rid of the requirement for multiparty support from parliament (a
requirement of two-thirds approval of Hungary’s unicameral parliament).216 It
then passed “transitional provisions” giving Orbán’s chief prosecutor the power
to control case assignments.217 This ensured that an Orbán-approved prosecutor
could control the exercise of prosecutorial authority in key cases.
Poland’s leader also subverted the political independence of prosecutors.218
Legislation passed on January 28, 2016, accomplished this politicization by
merging the positions of Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General, bringing
both under the control of Kaczyński’s Minister of Justice, Zbigniew Ziobro (a
leading politician).219 The new legislation assigns this Minister comprehensive
power to reassign cases among prosecutors and give orders in specific cases,220
a striking departure from democratic norms prevailing in western democracies.
It also breaks down the tradition of walling off prosecution from control of the
de facto head of state by explicitly allowing the Justice Minister to share
information with outside parties. This provision legitimized Ziobro’s prior
practice of consulting with Kaczyński about ongoing investigations and
prosecutorial decisions.221
Even before the 2016 military coup, Erdoğan took steps to establish central
control over prosecution. He began to change the mechanisms for prosecutorial
control through a 2010 constitutional amendment (approved in a referendum)
restructuring the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which

215. BÁLINT MAGYAR, POST-COMMUNIST MAFIA STATE: THE CASE OF HUNGARY 50 (Bálint Bethlenfaly,
Ágnes Simon, Steven Nelson & Kata Paulin trans., 2016) (citing rumors of blackmail in conjunction with the
“unexpected resignation of the . . . generally respected . . . Chief Prosecutor in 2000”).
216. Venice Comm’n, Council of Europe, Opinion on CLXIII of 2011 on the Prosecution Service and Act
CLXIV of 2011 on the Status of the Prosecutor General, Prosecutors and Other Prosecution Employees and the
Prosecution Career, CDL-AD(2012)008, at ¶ 14 (June 19, 2012), https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/
documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2012)008-e.
217. See id. at ¶ 32 (a provision authorizing reassignment of cases without any reason can trigger arbitrary
removal of cases).
218. SADURSKI, supra note 191, at 124–26.
219. Id.
220. Id; cf. JAMES B. COMEY, A HIGHER LOYALTY: TRUTH, LIES, AND LEADERSHIP 234 (2018) (discussing
the norm of the FBI director not meeting privately with a President, lest the meeting undermine the bureau’s
independence).
221. See SADURSKI, supra note 191, at 125.
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appoints and disciplines prosecutors (and judges).222 In order to curtail
investigation and arrest of Justice and Development Party (AKP) members for
corruption, including high-ranking government officials, Erdoğan started
attacking the prosecutors verbally and then brought them under the control of
the central government beginning in 2013.223 He did this partly by curtailing the
power of prosecutors to secure police support for investigation independently.224
Erdoğan then transferred prosecutors (and judges) away from the corruption
cases and brought the HSYK under the control of political appointees.225
Erdoğan used the coup to replace career prosecutors with loyalists in huge
numbers, thus completing the establishment of a key element of presidential
control.226
Once the head of state has effective control over prosecution, he can use
this power to tilt electoral competition. Government prosecutors attack the
regime’s opponents and protect its supporters. The forms these attacks take vary
based on national law and culture, but in all cases centralized control over
administration paves the way for selective prosecution to undermine the rule of
law and electoral competition.
In Hungary, Orbán’s prosecutors have used the law as a political weapon
by charging opposition politicians with corruption.227 The prosecutor’s office
announces and publicizes prosecution at times calculated to influence
elections.228 The government usually drops the charges after the election, but
charging a politician with corruption can end her career. At the same time,
Fidesz corruption, which is rampant, almost never triggers prosecution.229
Turkey’s prosecutors sideline the regime’s political opponents with
different techniques.230 Prior to the coup, they usually charged Erdoğan’s
opponents with minor crimes unrelated to elections. The prosecution focused on
laws that many people violate in Turkey, such as tax laws.231 With increasing
frequency, especially after the coup, they arrest opposing legislators for
supposedly supporting terrorist groups.232
Turkey also uses prosecution as a weapon to shrink the public sphere. The
government arrested 500 defendants in between 2008 and 2011, including some

222. GINSBURG & HUQ, supra note 190, at 106. The 2017 referendum renamed this Council as the “Council
of Judges and Prosecutors” (HSK), eliminating the word “high.”
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. George, supra note 197 (discussing the replacement of prosecutors investigating AKP corruption with
“appointees willing to wind down the investigation”).
226. Id. (noting the huge dimensions of purges of prosecutors and judges).
227. MAGYAR, supra note 215, at 50–51, 223–24.
228. See id. at 50–51 (referring to prosecution announcements relevant to elections at the “best-timed
moments”).
229. Péter Krekó & Envedi Zsolt, Explaining Eastern Europe: Orbán’s Laboratory of Illiberalism, 29 J.
DEMOCRACY 39, 43–45 (2018).
230. See Ozan O. Varol, Stealth Authoritarianism, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1673, 1707–10 (2015).
231. Id.
232. See Varol, supra note 196, at 346.
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journalists, and charged eighty-six of those arrested with plotting a coup.233 The
court of appeals, however, dismissed those charges for lack of evidence in
2016.234 The government sued journalists and other critics for libel.235 The costly
lawsuits had a chilling effect as journalists self-censored to avoid civil suits, and
later, criminal prosecution for libel.236 The government also levied a $2.5 billion
fine against the Dogan Yayin media conglomerate, which forced it to sell off
important media outlets to groups aligned with the government.237 Since the
coup, Erdoğan’s government has become the world’s leader in jailing
journalists, with emergency powers and its grip on the courts facilitating the
repression of opposition journalism.238
While Poland has only recently centralized prosecution, already some signs
indicate that Kaczyński may likewise exploit his control over the public
prosecutor to shrink the public sphere, as he has begun to use prosecution as a
weapon against political opponents. The Public Prosecutor launched a criminal
investigation against Andrez Rzeplinski, the former head of the Constitutional
Court, for “abuse of power.”239 The alleged “abuse” involved resisting PiS’ court
packing.240
Similarly, the Minister of Justice threatened to sue professors and Ph.D.
students who criticized revisions to the Criminal Code.241 The revisions in
question protect government officials in control of certain state owned
companies from corruption prosecution in a law advertised as enhancing
penalties for corruption.242 The Minister of Justice abandoned this gross invasion
of free speech quickly, but still, the announcement served as a warning that
anyone criticizing the regime too effectively risked prosecution.243 Kaczyński’s
government has brought at least one libel action to silence critical media.244
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

See George, supra note 197.
Id.
Varol, supra note 230, at 1697–98.
See id.
George, supra note 197.
ALINA POLYAKOVA, TORREY TAUSSIG, TED REINERT, KEMAL KIRIŞCI, AMANDA SLOAT, JAMES
KIRCHICK, MELISSA HOOPER, NORMAN EISEN & ANDREW KENEALY, FOREIGN POL’Y BROOKINGS, THE
ANATOMY OF ILLIBERAL STATES: ASSESSING AND RESPONDING TO DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN TURKEYND
CENTRAL EUROPE 11 (2019).
239. Vanessa Gera, Polish Prosecutors Investigate Court Head for Abuse of Power, DAILY NEWS (Aug. 19,
2016, 6:24 AM), https://www.nydailynews.com/sdut-polish-prosecutors-investigate-court-head-for-2016aug19
-story.html.
240. Id.
241. Barbara Grabowska-Moroz, Katarzyna Łakomiec & Michal Ziółkowski, The History of the 48-Hour
Lawsuit: Democratic Backsliding, Academic Freedom, and the Legislative Process in Poland, IACL-AIDC
BLOG (June 28, 2019), https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2019-posts/2019/6/27/the-history-of-the-48-hour-lawsuitdemocratic-backsliding-academic-freedom-and-the-legislative-process-in-poland.
242. Maximilian Steinbeis, Being a Good Dictator Is Not So Easy, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (June 15, 2019),
https://verfassungsblog.de/being-a-good-dictator-is-not-so-easy/.
243. See Grabowska-Moroz et al., supra note 241.
244. Polish Political Party Leader Brings Libel Action Against Critical Newspaper, COUNCIL OF EUR.,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/media-freedom/detail-alert?p_p_id=sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet&p_p_life
cycle=0&p_p_col_id=column-2&p_p_col_pos=5&p_p_col_count=10&_sojdashboard_WAR_coesojportlet_
alertPK=46102096#block-member-replies (last visited Nov. 23, 2020).
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Hence, in Turkey and Hungary establishment of the chief executive’s
effective control over prosecution undermined the rule of law. It led to selective
enforcement where law functions not as a set of general principles limiting
everybody’s conduct, but as a source of power to sideline opponents. The
regimes use prosecutorial power not to implement a rule of law, but to tilt
electoral competition in favor of the chief executive and his party and often to
shrink the space available for criticizing and opposing the government. In
Poland, recently centralized control of prosecution has not destroyed the rule of
law as of this writing, but the regime has already signaled its intent to use
Kaczyński’s enhanced capacity to persecute enemies to punish dissent, in
keeping with Kaczyński’s declared intent to follow Orbán’s lead.245
2. Ending Independent Electoral Commissions to Tilt Elections
Most successful democracies around the world use independent electoral
commissions to administer elections. By not allowing a single leader or political
party to control electoral administration, democracies provide an important
structural safeguard to ensure free and fair elections.
Since autocrats want to tilt the electoral playing field, they compromise
electoral commissions’ independence, allowing the autocrat to control them,
either directly or indirectly. In Hungary, under the pre-Fidesz system, the
election commission resembled the United States’ Federal Election Commission
and the electoral commissions in many U.S. states, in that it contained people
from more than one political party.246 Each of the five leading parties in
parliament controlled one seat and the parties filled the remaining seats by
mutual agreement.247 Fidesz terminated the mandates of members slated to
remain through 2014 and replaced the members formerly chosen by agreement
among the parties with its own members.248 This arrangement allowed Fidesz to
defeat a key mechanism for challenging Orbán’s monopoly on power, a
referendum. Under Hungarian law, the Electoral Commission must certify
referenda before placing them on the ballot, and the Fidesz-controlled
Commission has blocked this avenue of challenging the ruler’s power.249
Blocking a referendum entrenches the government, as a rebuke of a government

245. See Edit Zgut, Would-Be Autocrats: What Do Orbán and Kaczyński Have in Common?, VISEGRAD
INSIGHT (Sept. 23, 2019), https://visegradinsight.eu/would-be-autocrats/.
246. See Scott E. Thomas & Jeffrey H. Bowman, Obstacles to Effective Enforcement of the Federal Election
Campaign Act, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 575, 590 (2000) (Congress only allowed no more than three members of one
political party on the FEC); Election Administration at State and Local Levels, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-administrationat-state-and-local-levels.aspx (a number of states have bipartisan electoral commissions).
247. Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary’s Illiberal Turn: Disabling the
Constitution, 23 J. DEMOCRACY 138, 140 (2012).
248. Id.
249. See Miklós Bánkuti, Gábor Halmai & Kim Lane Scheppele, From Separation of Powers to a
Government Without Checks: Hungary’s Old and New Constitution, in CONSTITUTION FOR A DISUNITED
NATION—ON HUNGARY’S 2011 FUNDAMENTAL LAW 237, 256 (Gábor Attila Tóth ed., 2012).
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through a referendum in Hungary had provided a means of bringing down the
government.250
A similar effort to bring the administrative apparatus supervising elections
and funding political parties under the control of PiS and therefore Kaczyński
lies at the heart of the Polish government effort to tilt the rules of electoral
competition.251 Prior to Kaczyński’s ascent, Poland’s National Electoral
Commission, which supervises Polish elections, consisted of judges, selected by
fellow judges, an arrangement well designed to prevent a single party from
rigging elections.252 PiS, citing non-existent “monstrous” irregularities in
elections that it kept losing, passed a bill giving the Kaczyński-controlled lower
house of parliament the right to select the vast majority of members of the
electoral commission.253 The new law also authorizes commissioners indirectly
controlled by PiS to gerrymander election districts.254
Turkey also interfered with the independence of its electoral commission,
the Supreme Board of Elections (SBE) (a group of judges as in Poland) and
lower level administrative bodies. AKP replaced eight of the SBE’s eleven
members (placing three in custody) and 221 “lower-level election board
chairpersons” (placing sixty-seven in custody).255 It also placed over 500
electoral board staff in custody.256 The AKP-dominated SBE invalidated the
election of an opposition candidate as mayor of Istanbul in 2019 based on the
claim that civil servants did not run the elections, a common arrangement in
Turkey.257 This gambit, however, did not prove successful, as the opposition
candidate won the rerun by a wider margin.258
Sometimes, as in Turkey, the autocrats rely upon their control over
electoral agencies to do almost all of the dirty work.259 In those cases, the chief
executive’s effective control of the executive branch provides the primary means
of tilting elections.

250. Id. at 256 n.31.
251. Cf. Richard Albert & Michael Pal, The Democratic Resilience of the Canadian Constitution, in
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS?, supra note 196, at 117, 127–32 (arguing that Canada’s independent
electoral commission and other administrative entities have contributed to Canada’s constitutional resilience).
See generally Bruce A. Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000).
252. See SADURSKI, supra note 191, at 141.
253. Id. at 140–41.
254. Id. at 141–42; Wojciech Sadurski, Constitutional Crisis in Poland, in CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
IN CRISIS?, supra note 196, at 257, 260.
255. OFF. FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. AND HUM. RTS., REPUBLIC OF TURKEY, CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM,
16 APRIL 2017: FINAL REPORT 2, 7, 8 (2017), https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/6/2/324816.pdf.
256. Id. at 8.
257. Carlotta Gall, Turkey Orders New Election for Istanbul Mayor, In Setback for Opposition, N.Y. TIMES
(May 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/06/world/europe/turkey-istanbul-mayor-election.html.
258. Carlotta Gall, Turkey’s President Suffers Stinging Defeat in Istanbul Election Redo, N.Y. TIMES (June
23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/23/world/europe/istanbul-mayor-election-erdogan.html?auth=
login-google.
259. Poland seems poised to follow the Turkish reliance on takeover of electoral commissions to subvert
democracy. But no election has taken place under the new structure as of this writing.
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In Hungary, however, legislation played an even larger role than executive
power.260 The Fidesz-controlled parliament heavily gerrymandered legislative
districts and passed laws making it hard for ethnic minorities and those fleeing
the regime to vote, while authorizing and facilitating voting among supportive
ethnic Hungarians living in countries near Hungary.261 The heavy
gerrymandering and manipulation of the electorate permitted Fidesz to obtain
about 69% of the seats in parliament with only about 45% of the vote in 2014.262
Turkey employed legislative gerrymanders as well.263
Even when the parliament passed legislation tilting elections, the partisan
electoral commission made its own contributions to the project of tilting the
electoral playing field. In Hungary, the partisan Electoral Commission sent out
confusing information to groups likely to vote against Fidesz while making it
easy for groups thought supportive of Fidesz to vote.264
In Turkey, the electoral commission disobeyed Turkish law by accepting
unstamped ballots in the 2017 referendum establishing authoritarian rule.265
Interference with civil liberties during the state of emergency also contributed
to this narrow victory for autocracy.266
Thus, centralized control over administration regularly contributes to
tilting the electoral playing field, as electoral commissions brought under the
political control of the autocrat’s party shape the electorate to tilt electoral
outcomes in the autocrat’s favor. But legislating unfair electoral rules has also
played a role, especially in Hungary.
3. Supplanting Independent Media Authorities to Shrink the Space for
Dissent
Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, like most democratic countries, established
formally independent media regulators.267 To prevent a single ruler and his party
from capturing the media authorities, these countries established mechanisms to
ensure multiparty representation on their media councils.
The new autocrats’ political parties brought the administrative agencies
regulating the media under the chief executives’ control after amending the
media laws to allow their party to select all or most of the councils’ members.

260. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, An Election in Question, Part Two, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014,
8:28 AM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/hungary-an-election-in-question-part-2/.
261. See Scheppele, supra note 192, at 549–50 n.11.
262. POLYAKOVA ET AL., supra note 238, at 14.
263. See, e.g., Cenk Aygül, Electoral Manipulation in March 30, 2014 Turkish Local Elections, 17 TURKISH
STUD. 181, 183 (2016).
264. See Kim Lane Scheppele, Hungary, An Election in Question, Part 4, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2014, 8:40
AM), https://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/28/hungary-an-election-in-question-part-4/.
265. OFF. FOR DEMOCRATIC INSTS. AND HUM. RTS., supra note 255, at 21.
266. See id. at 1–2.
267. See Adriana Mutu, The Formal Independence of National Media Regulatory Authorities: A CrossCountry Comparative Study 61–62, 98 (May 2015) (Ph.D. dissertation, Autonomous University of Barcelona)
(finding the model of independent media regulators and public broadcasting the “prevailing model” in Europe).
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Their supporters then used the media authorities to shrink the public space for
opposition.
Orbán’s media council levied hefty fines on broadcast media for failing to
provide “balanced” news coverage to intimidate opposition media.268 The media
council also fired unsympathetic journalists employed in public broadcasting
and cancelled long running shows with perspectives at odds with the Orbán
government.269 The Orbán government allocates digital, terrestrial, cable
frequencies, and crucial state advertising dollars based on political criteria.270
All of these measures have created a juggernaut propagating state propaganda.271
On the other hand, Orbán has interfered with the media council’s
independence even though Fidesz controls it in order to exert yet greater control
over the media. In November of 2018, owners of media outlets donated 476
television and radio stations to a non-profit foundation promoting “Christian and
national values.”272 When opposition groups challenged the foundation for
violating national media laws, Orbán defeated the media council’s jurisdiction
over the foundation.273 By 2019, few media outlets remained independent
beyond a handful of websites in Budapest.274
Similarly, Turkey’s AKP-dominated Supreme Council of Radio and
Television (RTUK) supplemented prosecution of journalists with broader
attacks on media organizations. That body issued fifty warnings and 112 fines
against television channels and seven warnings and eleven fines to radio stations
under very broad laws in 2016 alone.275 In the wake of the failed coup attempt,
this body closed two dozen television and radio outlets in the same year.276 The
government also ordered the closure of dozens of newspapers.277
Turkey has a Directorate General of Press and Information that controls
press accreditation necessary for access to the Prime Minister and his press
office.278 In 2015, the government brought this organization firmly under
Erdoğan’s control by reducing the number of seats held by media representatives
from more than 50% to a third.279 In the crackdown after the coup, the
Directorate revoked nearly 800 press cards.280
268. Bánkuti et al., supra note 247, at 139–40.
269. Bánkuti et al., supra note 249, at 258–59.
270. Cristina Maza, Viktor Orban’s Authoritarian Media Control Is Spreading to Hungary’s Neighbor,
Report Warns, NEWSWEEK (June 5, 2019, 11:22 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/viktor-orbans-authoritarianmedia-control-spreading-hungarys-neighbors-report-warns.
271. Krekó & Zsolt, supra note 229, at 44–46.
272. The Entanglement of Powers: How Viktor Orban Hollowed Out Hungary’s Democracy, ECONOMIST
(Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2019/08/29/how-viktor-orban-hollowed-out-hungarysdemocracy.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Freedom House, Freedom of the Press 2017—Turkey, REFWORLD (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.ref
world.org/docid/59fc67b9a.html.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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Turkey also centralized procurement at the highest level of the executive
branch.281 Turkey used this authority over procurement to bring additional
financial pressures to bear in its drive to suppress dissent and support
sympathetic media.282 A few large holding companies that earn a majority of
their revenue in construction, energy, mining, and financial services own most
of the important private media properties in Turkey. Erdoğan’s government uses
government procurement and licensing to punish dissent and put important
media assets in friendly hands. For example, the government determined which
holding company would purchase the Sabah-ATV media group in exchange for
a multibillion-dollar airport construction contract.283 It also withholds state
advertising from critical outlets, pressuring them to fire critical journalists.284
Purges of journalists insufficiently supportive of Erdoğan through prosecution
and financial pressures put 10,000 journalists out of work by the end of 2016,
according to the Turkish Journalists Association.285
Kaczyński’s centralization of control over media regulation has converted
public broadcasting into a state tool of propaganda reminiscent of the
Communist period.286 Although the Constitution vests the formally nonpartisan
National Council of Radio and Television Broadcasting (Broadcast Council)
with the authority to appoint public broadcasting managers, PiS passed a “small
media law” ending the terms of incumbents prematurely and moving the
appointment authority for managers to the Secretary of the Treasury.287 This
Kaczyński supporter then replaced the management of public broadcasting with
strong supporters of the government. These changes led to the replacement of
some two hundred journalists from public broadcasting with far-right
journalists.288 While Poland never had a fully independent public broadcasting
service, the structural changes have effected an extreme capture of public
broadcasting. Poland’s Constitutional Tribunal held the Small Media Law’s
provisions consolidating central control over appointment and removal
unconstitutional under the Constitution’s provisions establishing the Broadcast
Council’s power over public broadcasting and its mandate to preserve free
speech and freedom of information.289 This ruling acknowledges that changes in
structure centralizing control of the executive branch lead to infringements of
liberty. Kaczyński’s PiS party defied the ruling and passed legislation
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. See SADURSKI, supra note 191, at 138 (explaining that the government “transformed” the public media
into a “propaganda machine”).
287. CTR. FOR PEACE STUDS. ET AL., RESISTING ILL DEMOCRACIES IN EUROPE: UNDERSTANDING THE
PLAYBOOK OF ILLIBERAL GOVERNMENTS TO BETTER RESIST THEM: A CASE-STUDY OF CROATIA, HUNGARY,
POLAND, AND SERBIA 20 (2017), https://humanrightshouse.org/noop-media/documents/22908.pdf.
288. ANNABELLE CHAPMAN, FREEDOM HOUSE, PLURALISM UNDER ATTACK: THE ASSAULT ON PRESS
FREEDOM IN POLAND 9 (2017), https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_Poland_Report_Final_
2017.pdf.
289. The Act Amending the Broadcast Act, K 13/16 (Pol.).
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establishing a Council of National Media in order to supplant the constitutionally
established independent Broadcast Council.290 President Duda and the PiS
majority in parliament have appointed the majority of the Council of National
Media, which now oversees public broadcasting and has authority to continue
the purge.291
In a bizarre example of what can happen when an autocrat exercises too
much control over administration, the Kaczyński government’s politicized
public television service turned around and filed lawsuits against Polish
Ombudsman Adam Bodnar and law professor Wojciech Sadurski for accusing
the service of hate speech in connection with the assassination of the mayor of
Gdansk.292 Bodnar won his case in court, but as of this writing, some of the suits
against Sadurski, one of which makes criminal charges, remain pending.293
Thus, centralized control over the management of public media has led, albeit
indirectly, to the state broadcasting service becoming an organ working to
suppress speech. Even unsuccessful prosecution can chill free speech.
Kaczyński, like Erdoğan and Orbán also had his government use economic
measures to bolster sympathetic media and discourage criticism.294 Kaczyński’s
regime cut off public advertising and other income sources from critical media
outlets, whilst paying for advertising in sympathetic private media outlets.295
And the Broadcast Council has acted to chill speech by levying a substantial fine
on a television station for reporting on demonstrations around Parliament.296
When the television station threatened to go to court, the Broadcast Council
withdrew the penalty, but the threat sent the message that media outlets that dare
to cover anti-PiS activity place them themselves at risk.297
In Hungary and Turkey, elected heads of state established centralized
control over the executive branch of government and used that control to
severely erode constitutional democracy by undermining the rule of law, tilting
the electoral playing field, and shrinking the public space for opposition. Poland
has asserted similar centralized control recently and has started down the same
path. Well-functioning democracies do not permit centralized control over the
entire executive branch of government, but autocracy might well be defined by
that control.

290. See SADURSKI, supra note 191, at 16.
291. See id. at 139.
292. Armin von Bogdandy & Luke Dimitrios Spieker, Countering the Judicial Silencing of Critics: Novel
Ways to Enforce European Values, VERFASSUNGSBLOG (Mar. 6, 2019), https://verfassungsblog.de/counteringthe-judicial-silencing-of-critics-novel-ways-to-enforce-european-values/.
293. In addition, Kaczyński himself brought a civil case on behalf of PiS against Sadurski for discrediting
an organization “in the face of public opinion,” which is illegal under Article 212 of the Polish criminal code,
albeit with a truth defense available. David Walsh, Critic of Poland’s Ruling Party PiS Slams “Politically
Motivated” Libel Cases, EURONEWS (May 13, 2019), https://www.euronews.com/2019/05/13/critic-of-polands-ruling-party-pis-slams-political-motivated-libel-cases.
294. CTR. FOR PEACE STUDS. ET AL., supra note 287, at 20.
295. Id.
296. SADURSKI, supra note 191, at 139.
297. See id.
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III. LESSONS FOR AMERICA
The analysis above suggests that the unitary executive provides a pathway
to autocracy. It shows that if an elected chief executive with autocratic
tendencies obtains effective control over the executive branch of government,
he will likely use that power to erode democracy and the rule of law. This Part
demonstrates this conclusion’s relevance to American practice and explains why
the Court should read Seila Law narrowly or, better yet, jettison it entirely, in
light of the lessons learned about how autocratic heads of state undermine
democracy.
A. THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE PATHWAY TO AUTOCRACY IN AMERICA
The power to remove government officials and replace them with the chief
executive’s preferred people provides a powerful weapon to convert the
government from an instrument of law into the instrument of an autocratic chief
executive. A President can simply fire conscientious people and seek to replace
them with quislings willing to do his bidding. Part III’s account implies that the
chief executive’s practical ability to fire people helps produce autocracy, even if
his appointment power gives him only informal control over key appointments.
Effective control by the chief executive matters, not the formal arrangement of
empowering the chief executive to choose each appointee by himself.
Comparative constitutional law scholars frequently note that comparative
study illuminates our own experience.298 We can see, in retrospect, that
American Presidents have sought to use control over the executive branch to
subvert the rule of law and even democracy. It would be naive to think that this
cannot happen again and go further.
The Watergate scandal demonstrated the utility of at-will presidential
removal authority in subverting not just the rule of law, but free and fair
elections. The Watergate story also shows the value of for-cause provisions in
protecting the rule of law. President Richard Nixon decided to tilt the electoral
playing field in his favor by trying to get dirt on his opponents, ordering a
burglary to get documents from the Democratic National Committee housed in
the Watergate complex and ordering tax audits of his political opponents (a
possible prelude to using the Turkish tactic of selective prosecution for tax
violations to sideline opponents).299 In response to evidence of the Watergate
break-in, Attorney General Elliott Richardson appointed a special counsel to
investigate.300 President Nixon responded to this threat of uncovering his effort
to tilt the electoral playing field by forcing the resignation of law-abiding
subordinates and trying to put more pliant officials in their stead. Nixon ordered
Attorney General Richardson to fire the special counsel.301 But the Justice
298. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional
Experience, 51 DUKE L. J. 223, 255–59 (2001) (finding comparative constitutional experience illuminating while
noting some limitations).
299. BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 83 (1976).
300. Id. at 61.
301. Id. at 24.
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Department regulations governing the special counsel office only authorized forcause removal, and no cause existed.302 Richardson refused to violate his oath
of office and resigned in protest.303 Nixon then ordered his successor, William
Ruckelshaus, to fire the special counsel.304 Ruckelshaus likewise refused and
resigned.305 President Nixon, however, found an “obsequious instrument[] of his
pleasure” (in Hamilton’s words) in Ruckelshaus’ successor, Robert Bork, who
agreed to fire the special counsel.306 Government officials’ allegiance to their
constitutional duty to not bend to presidential will helped vindicate the rule of
law. The reaction to the “Saturday Night Massacre”—the forced resignation of
Richardson and Ruckelshaus—led to increased support for impeachment.307
And Nixon resigned to avoid almost certain impeachment and removal.308
The George W. Bush Administration also took steps to centralize
prosecution in ways that arguably undermined the rule of law to tilt the electoral
playing field. The Bush Administration encouraged U.S. Attorneys to prosecute
voting fraud cases and other cases.309 They reviewed these cases but ultimately
demurred for lack of evidence.310 Bush’s Attorney General, Alberto Gonzalez,
then fired several well-respected U.S. Attorneys.311 An uproar in Congress,
however, ensued over this attempt to weaponize prosecution to tilt electoral
competition, and Gonzalez resigned.312
Donald Trump has also sought to use prosecution to tilt the electoral
playing field, by protecting his friends and persecuting his enemies. Trump has
more broadly encouraged prosecutors not to go after Republicans committing
crimes, lest the prosecution damage the Republicans’ electoral chances.313
Conversely, he asked the DOJ to investigate Democratic politicians and other
“enemies,” including Hillary Clinton, John Kerry, Joe Biden, James Comey, and
Oakland Mayor Libby Schaaf, while publicly suggesting that his political
opponents (like James Comey and Hillary Clinton) should go to jail without

302. See Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 109–10 (D.D.C. 1973) (explaining that the regulations governing
the special counsel only permitted removal for “extraordinary improprieties”).
303. WOODWARD & BERNSTEIN, supra note 299, at 70.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 70–71; THE FEDERALIST NO. 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that the Constitution aimed
to prevent appointment of “obsequious instruments” of presidential “pleasure”); Bork, 366 F. Supp. at 107
(Robert Bork fired special prosecutor Archibold Cox).
307. See WOODWARD & BERNSTEIN, supra note 299, at 113 (noting that House members drew up articles
of impeachment after the firing of Richardson and Ruckelshaus).
308. Id. at 412.
309. Driesen, supra note 147, at 712.
310. See id. at 712–13.
311. Id. at 710.
312. Id.
313. See Adam Liptak, Conservative Lawyers Say Trump Has Undermined the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/politics/conservative-lawyers-trump.html (quoting
Peter Keisler, a former acting Bush Administration Attorney General, as saying that “the President has attacked
the Justice Department for indictments of Republican congressmen on the stated ground that prosecutions would
hurt Republican chances in the midterm elections”).
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citing any evidence of a crime.314 When Trump’s efforts to obtain a DOJ
investigation of Joe Biden produced no public announcement of such an
investigation, he withheld military aid from Ukraine in order to force Ukraine’s
government to announce an investigation.315 This abuse of power triggered his
impeachment, but the Senate acquitted him.316 Trump has also obtained the
resignation of key cybersecurity officials, thereby inviting Russian interference
in the 2020 election.317 And Trump exercised authority over the Department of
Commerce to place a census question about citizenship on the ballot in order to
tilt elections, although the Supreme Court ultimately checked this abuse of
power.318
Trump has brought the Justice Department under firmer central control by
removing Jeffrey Sessions and appointing William Barr as Attorney General, by
all accounts a firm believer in the unitary executive theory.319 Barr has acted
more like an agent of autocracy than like a supporter of prosecutorial
independence.320 He redacted parts of the Mueller Report on Russian
Interference in the 2016 Election (“Mueller Report”), announced that the report
did not show that the President had committed obstruction of justice in advance
of release of evidence to the contrary, investigated civil servants investigating
Russian interference in the 2016 election, and instigated a process leading to a
DOJ request to dismiss charges against Michael Flynn, a Trump aide who had
pled guilty to charges of lying to the FBI about his Russian contacts.321 Thus,
314. Paul Blumenthal, Donald Trump Publicly Suggested DOJ Investigate Joe Biden, HUFFINGTON POST,
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/william-barr-trump-investigate-biden_n_5ccb54ade4b0e4d7572fdf15 (May 3,
2019); Quint Forgey & Carla Marinucci, Trump Asks Sessions to Consider Prosecuting Oakland Mayor Over
ICE Raid, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/story/2018/05/16/trump-sessions-oakland-mayor-prosecutionsanctuary-cities-594470 (May 16, 2018, 5:52 PM); Eric Levitz, Trump Calls for John Kerry’s Prosecution
Under the Logan Act, INTELLIGENCER (May 9, 2019), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/05/trump-calls-forjohn-kerrys-prosecution-under-the-logan-act.html; Michael Schmidt & Maggie Haberman, Trump Wanted to
Order Justice Dept. to Prosecute Comey and Clinton, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/20/us/politics/president-trump-justice-department.html.
315. Articles of Impeachment Against Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong., art. I (1st Sess.
2019); Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with President Zelenskyy of Ukraine (July 25, 2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Unclassified09.2019.pdf?fbclid=IwAR2NRvNaYhnrFMBa2SSG1bumdyNoJhXVCDNtBYugM-klXGctnWce6qDjD0.
316. Peter Baker, Impeachment Trial Updates: Senate Acquits Trump, Ending Historic Trial, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/impeachment-vote.html.
317. See Josephine Wolff, Cybersecurity Officials Are Leaving the Federal Government. That’s a Problem,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/opinion/cybersecurity-departures
-government.html.
318. Dep’t of Commerce v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2573–76 (2019) (holding that the reasons given for
adding a citizenship question to the census were pretextual).
319. See, e.g., Emily Bazelon, Who Is Bill Barr?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 26, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2019/10/26/opinion/william-barr-trump.html (quoting Douglas Kmiec characterizing William Barr’s
view of executive power as one that George III would have loved).
320. Cf. id. (describing Barr as championing the President while diminishing DOJ’s credibility).
321. See Elec. Priv. Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 442 F. Supp. 3d 37, 50–51 (D.D.C. 2020) (declining to
credit Barr’s defense of his redactions as legally required in light of his misleading statements about the Mueller
report’s findings on obstruction of justice); Donald Ayer, Barr’s Flynn Dismissal Motion Portends Greater
Abuses Ahead, ATLANTIC (May 17, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/barrs-flynndismissal-motion-portends-greater-abuses-ahead/611779/; Jack Goldsmith & Nathan Sobel, The Durham
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belief in the unitary executive has led to pressures to erode the rule of law by
discouraging lawful investigation of the President and his minions and go after
President Trump’s opponents.
The American experience shows that even our Presidents can seek to erode
the rule of law in order to entrench themselves in power. A President without an
executive branch willing to do his bidding, however, cannot establish an
autocracy. A President with control over our prosecution service and other
significant government agencies has a chance. If the government officials
internalize the unitary executive theory and simply obey the President, the rule
of law can readily perish. The President simply has to order underlings to
disobey the law or at least apply it selectively. We have rarely seen pervasive
undermining of the rule of law in the past partly because our civil servants
customarily follow the law and our constitutional culture supports that custom.
This culture of fidelity to law, however, comes from a series of political
decisions embracing internal separation of powers over time, including the
adoption of the Oath Clause, the creation of a civil services insulated from
political pressures, the establishment of independent agencies, and our tradition
of prosecutorial independence established at the Founding.322 But the Court’s
embrace of the unitary executive theory likely will further erode this custom.
In principle, an executive branch following the leader’s orders can utterly
destroy freedom and the rule of law. The executive branch alone has the capacity
to embarrass people with indictments, arrest them, and imprison them. It alone
grants broadcast licenses. It disburses government funds and decides whom to
enforce the law against. Even an agency like the CFPB, if subject to complete
presidential control, can become a tool to entrench an autocratic President in
power, prosecuting businesses not kowtowing to the President while allowing
businesses owned by supporters to abuse consumers. The new authoritarians
have learned to use economic pressures to subdue opposition, and an American
President can emulate their tactics.
The case studies, moreover, teach us that once a President controls the
executive branch of government, judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights

Investigation: What We Know and What It Means, LAWFARE (July 9, 2020, 9:58 AM), https://www.lawfare
blog.com/durham-investigation-what-we-know-and-what-it-means (discussing Barr’s ordering of the Durham
investigation of the Russian investigation and characterizing it as political and inappropriate); Laura Jarrett,
More than 2000 Former Prosecutors and Other DOJ Officials Call on Attorney General Bill Barr to Resign,
CNN POLITICS (Feb. 17, 2020, 5:29 P), https://www.cnn.com/2020/02/16/politics/prosecutors-doj-officialsbarr-resign/index.html (discussing Barr’s motion to dismiss charges against Michael Flynn after he pleaded
guilty twice); see also In re Flynn, 961 F.3d 1215 (D.C. Cir.), order vacated and rehearing en banc granted,
2020 WL 4355389 (D.C. Cir. July 30, 2020) (issuing an order of mandamus to prevent the Court from holding
a hearing on the DOJ’s request to dismiss charges against Michael Flynn).
322. See Josh Blackman, Presidential Maladministration, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 397, 479 (2018); Johnsen,
supra note 36, at 1560–62 (identifying legal advisers with the executive branch as an “underappreciated” source
of constraint); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch
from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2331–35 (2006); Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between
Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 435–37 (2009); cf. Jacobs, supra note 10, at
381 (discussing congressional decisions to distribute authorities among administrative agencies “at varying
degrees of remove from the White House” to create a particular internal balance of power).
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cannot adequately constrain a clever autocratic President.323 They show that
techniques exist to evade the courts and to inflict immense damage to the rule of
law and democracy.
Orbán avoids judicial review of abuses of prosecutorial authority designed
to sideline opponents by dropping announced corruption charges after elections
rather than pursuing them in court. The pre-2016 Turkish government’s model
of prosecuting political opponents for minor offenses that normally do not
trigger prosecution also provides a way of avoiding judicial reversal, as the
courts have no legitimate means of avoiding guilty verdicts based on selective
prosecution if the evidence justifies conviction. All of these countries fail to
prosecute corrupt regime supporters, and no judicial check exists on that.324 So,
a President with the authority to politicize investigations or prosecution, a
necessary consequence of the political dimension of the unitary executive
theory, can do enormous damage to the rule of law. In addition, some executive
branch actions subverting the rule of law can escape judicial review because
officials carry them out in secret or because of justiciability barriers.
The point that the judiciary cannot provide an adequate remedy for an
executive branch under the political control of an unrestrained despot is
consistent with the Framers’ view that the Ratifiers insistence on a bill of rights
was superfluous. They thought that checks and balances and separation of
powers provide more potent security for liberty than a bill of rights, a view
echoed in Seila Law and other recent cases.325 The unitary executive theory,
while consistent with separation of powers, dismantles checks and balances.
The United States, moreover, has less robust checks on executive power
than Turkey, Hungary, and Poland had prior to their election of authoritarian
leadership. The constitutions in countries that suffered through Nazi or
Communist dictatorship usually secure prosecutorial independence either
through requirements for multiparty support for chief prosecutors or a
controlling or large role for an independent council (usually of judges) in
selecting prosecutors. By contrast, the President of the United States can
nominate political friends to key posts under the United States Constitution.
Control of the Senate may suffice to provide a President with complete
control over the executive branch of government sufficient to destroy the rule of
law and democracy over time. Because the Constitution denied the President
authority to unilaterally appoint or remove officials, many of the

323. See generally Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Courts’ Limited Ability to Protect Constitutional
Rights, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 293 (2018) (explaining why courts’ ability to protect constitutional rights may be quite
limited).
324. Cf. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424 (1976) (holding that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity
from liability).
325. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 (2020) (“The Framers
recognized that . . . structural protections against abuse of power were critical to preserving liberty.”) (quoting
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 730 (1986)); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 570–71 (2014) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (explaining that the Framers found structural protections so important to liberty that they did not at
first consider a bill of rights necessary); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 449–53 (1998) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (stating that separation of powers secures liberty).
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antifederalists—those who opposed ratification of the Constitution without
additional amendments—did not cite fear of an autocratic President unilaterally
destroying democracy as a reason to vote against the Constitution (although
some did). They accepted Hamilton’s argument that restraints of the President’s
power over the executive branch made him too weak to establish an autocracy
because that argument fits the constitutional text. Instead, they feared that a
“cabal” between the President and the Senate would undo the fledgling
American republic.326
The Senate, however, might well have the capacity to check an autocratic
President. It can refuse to approve the appointment of officials unless they
evince a clear commitment to the rule of law. It can also remove a President if
the House impeaches a lawless President.
We cannot assume, however, that those weaker constraints will prove so
effective as to make a unitary executive safe over time. For one thing, the Senate
has largely abandoned the role of making sure that key appointees show
dedication to the rule of law and expertise. Instead, it often operates under the
principle that the President is entitled to the officials he wants. So, it has in recent
times approved appointees who clearly aimed to harm the rule of law.
Furthermore, impeachment requires a two-thirds vote, so that it only operates as
a constraint when partisan division is mild and dedication to the rule of law
pervasive among federal politicians. Political scientists, however, have shown
that autocratic leaders usually take over during times of partisan division, when
the legislature’s failure to function effectively leads to some support for a
demagogue.327 To gain election, any President must have the support over at
least a substantial minority of the population, and Senators have incentives not
to remove a President with such substantial support from the electorate. Given
the robust evidence that most voters know shockingly little about politics or
government, we cannot assume that public support for a President driving
toward autocracy will diminish substantially because of misconduct, even when
carried out in broad daylight.328
Even though a majority of voters may come to recognize an authoritarian
in the White House, that realization may not necessarily translate into Senate
action, because a very small minority of voters can elect the Senate. In fact,
because of disparities in state population sizes, less than 20% of the population
can create a majority in the Senate (although in practice elections have not

326. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION
270–75 (1996).
327. See, e.g., LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 195, at 115–17 (2018) (using Chile’s loss of its democracy
to illustrate the idea that “polarization can destroy democratic norms”).
328. See generally Aziz Z. Huq, Binding the Executive (by Law or by Politics), 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 777, 818
(2012) (the political science literature “finds scant evidence that the public is even minimally informed . . . about
specific national issues”); Pildes, supra note 169, at 1421 (raising questions about public awareness of legal
issues and the ability of “partisan political actors” to manipulate their views); cf. ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC (2010) (arguing that law does not
check the President but that political checks on the President prove adequate).
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realized the theoretically worst outcome).329 Minority control of the Senate has
accelerated, with the Senate in 2019 having a Republican majority after 57% of
the electorate voted for Democratic Senatorial candidates in 2018.330 (Since
Senate terms are staggered, majoritarian outcomes in the Senate might not
perfectly mirror the results of one year’s elections, but this still suggests
skewing).
Structural constitutional deviations from majoritarianism played a role in
the rise of autocracy in Hungary, Poland, and Turkey. In Turkey, Erdoğan’s
AKP party obtained a two-thirds majority in Parliament with just 34% of the
vote in 2002, thanks to a law denying representation to parties winning less than
10% of the vote. Similarly, Poland’s PiS party obtained a parliamentary majority
with less than 38% support in an election with low turnout.331 The constitutional
compromises at the founding of Hungary’s post-Soviet democracy also gave a
boost to larger parties in order to avoid excessive fragmentation in Parliament.
That led to Fidesz capturing a two-thirds majority in Hungary’s legislature with
only 53% of the vote in 2010.332 That supermajority enabled Fidesz to pass
constitutional amendments (and legislation) transforming the Hungarian system
to empower Viktor Orbán. Anti-majoritarian features in a Constitution (like the
electoral college and the Senate) can enable an autocrat to take power without
majority support or obtain a supermajority with only a bare majority of the
electorate approving of his party.
Fully evaluating America’s vulnerability to autocracy would require a
book, and I have written one that addresses the presidential power threat more
completely while mentioning many broader vulnerabilities.333 The literature on
democratic erosion teaches us that many elements work together to facilitate
democratic decline. Judges considering the matter cannot have clairvoyance
about the future of American democracy. But the history of the world shows that
democracies are rare, and many have perished. When a judge writes a new rule
of constitutional law (even if derived from the judge’s understanding of original
intent), that creates long-term consequences. If the rule creates a risk for
democracy, as a rule creating a unitary executive does, that rule would pose a
long-term risk. In light of the role of sudden shocks, personalities, and hard to
predict political factors in destroying democracy, the subject would seem to
demand judicial humility with respect to future predictions.
But there is little doubt that internal separation of powers—the name
scholars have given to intra-branch checks and balances—lessens the risk of
democratic decline, at least slowing it down when a despot gets elected.
Furthermore, as the Trump impeachment shows, resistance by civil servants able

329. Eric W. Orts, Senate Democracy: Our Lockean Paradox, 68 AM. U. L. REV. 1981, 1985–86 (2019).
330. Id. at 1987.
331. Sadurski, supra note 254, at 257.
332. POLYAKOVA ET AL., supra note 238, at 14.
333. See DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE SPECTER OF DICTATORSHIP AND JUDICIAL ENABLING OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER (forthcoming 2021).
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to withstand a despot can play an important role in making political checks on
autocracy feasible.
B. UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY AFTER SEILA LAW
Seila Law’s endorsement of the unitary executive theory could perform the
same role as statutes and constitutional amendments played in enabling
autocracy in Turkey, Poland, and Hungary. In effect, Seila Law amends the
Constitution, which has permitted many governmental departments to have
some independence from presidential will since 1789, often quite substantial
independence, to increase centralization through a new constitutional rule
written by the Justices. In Turkey, Poland, and Hungary, parliamentary
majorities (Poland), supermajorities (Hungary), and plebiscites (Turkey) drove
comparable changes in constitutional principle.
The experience in these countries suggests that the Seila Law majority’s
emphasis on bureaucratic threats to individual liberty, while in keeping with
contemporary conservative politics, does not comport with international
experience.334 The primary threat to democracy comes from the head of state’s
unchecked control over government officials. Functioning democracies, by
contrast, employ checks and balances to ensure the independence of key
government agencies. Furthermore, Justice Robert’s suggestion that government
officials must fear the President sounds in authoritarian philosophy, not the
practice of democratic government.
The Constitution does not require the Supreme Court to create a
constitutional rule facilitating autocracy. The Constitution does not specifically
authorize the Supreme Court to imply fine-grained presidential powers from
broad clauses not mentioning removal or from principles of separation of powers
in tension with checks and balances.335 It does, however, authorize Congress to
regulate removal authority under the Horizontal Sweeping Clause. That Clause
authorizes Congress to “make all laws . . . necessary and proper for carrying into
execution . . . all powers vested by this constitution in the government of the
United States . . . or in any department or officer thereof.”336 The President, of
course, only exercises power vested in the United States government and is an
officer of the United States government. Hence, the Court could have held that
Congress has the right to determine if the President can remove officials without
reason or instead only for just cause.
Justice Kagan’s Seila Law dissent argued that wise judgment about
removal requires political judgment more appropriate to Congress than to a

334. See TIMOTHY SNYDER, BLACK EARTH: THE HOLOCAUST AS HISTORY AND WARNING (2015)
(explaining that civil servants mitigated the Holocaust when states survived Nazi invasion); Max Weber, The
Three Types of Legitimate Rule, 4 BERKELEY PUB. SOC’Y & INSTS. 1 (1958) (contrasting bureaucratic
identification with law with charismatic rule of personality).
335. See Van Alstyne, supra note 18, at 792–94, 800–04 (arguing that the Court has limited authority to
imply additional presidential powers); see also Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204, 233–34 (1821)
(rejecting idea that necessity justifies an expansion of executive power).
336. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
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group of unelected judges.337 Seila Law limits congressional ability to take the
risks of authoritarianism into account in shaping future administration, thereby
making it hard to learn lessons from authoritarians abroad or President Trump’s
assault on the rule of law at home.
The principle that the Court should construe the Constitution to further the
Framers’ goal of preserving a democratic republic supports a narrow
construction of Seila Law, at a minimum. Part III demonstrated that media
authorities and electoral commissions often play a key role in destroying
democracies. Our Federal Election Commission (FEC) and Federal
Communication Commission (FCC), as their names suggest, have multimember commissions at their heads. The rule established in Seila Law that the
President must have unlimited authority to remove single directors of an agency
does not require the President to have the authority to remove the commissioners
of the U.S. media and electoral authorities at will.338 Seila Law, however,
contains a dictum confining its previous decisions on independent commissions
to those that “do not wield substantial executive power.”339 The Court should
not use that dictum, which is in considerable tension with Humphrey’s Executor,
to interfere with these commissions’ (or other commissions’) independence.
Part III also showed that prosecutors can play a large role in undermining
the rule of law and democracy. Seila Law’s dictum leaves room to secure the
independence of lower level prosecutors, as it recognizes that the Court has
approved congressional restrictions on presidential removal for “inferior officers
with limited duties and no policymaking or administrative authority.”340 In light
of the Seila Law Court’s emphasis on legislative precedent as a measure of the
constitutional legitimacy of removal protection, Congress should be able to
robustly protect the independence of District Attorneys.341
Seila Law, however, likely prevents Congress from taking an important
step recommended by Cass Sunstein to protect our democracy and the rule of
law from a President abusing prosecutorial authority to punish his enemies and
protect his friends—making the entire Justice Department, including its top
officials, independent.342 And a President determined to use executive power can
use almost any government power to reward friends and punish enemies, thereby
subverting democracy and the rule of law. For these reasons, the Court should

337. See Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2236–38 (2020) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
338. See id. at 2197 (majority opinion) (“We hold that the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual
removable only for inefficiency, neglect or malfeasance violates the separation of powers.”).
339. Id. at 2199–2200.
340. Id.
341. Cf id. at 2201–02 (treating the lack of sufficient historical support for the CFPB’s structure as an
indication of a “severe constitutional problem”).
342. See Cass R. Sunstein, Imagine that Donald Trump Has Almost No Control Over Justice, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/opinion/sunday/trump-barr-justice-department.html
(proposing that Congress make the DOJ an independent agency).
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consider overruling or sharply limiting Seila Law, which is inconsistent with its
holdings in Morrison and Humphrey’s Executor.343
Leaving the decision about whether to give various officials for-cause
removal authority to Congress would help the Court avoid problematic formalist
line-drawing. Under Seila Law, the question of whether Congress may protect
officials from politically motivated and potentially abusive removal depends
upon difficult to define distinctions between executive authority on the one hand
and adjudicative and legislative authority on the other with respect to
commissions or between principle and inferior officers.344 The fact that many
government agencies exercise several different types of authority makes such
line-drawing deeply problematic. Indeed, the Court has largely given up policing
one of the major dangers to democracy—delegation of vast powers to the
executive branch—on the ground that it cannot distinguish executive from
legislative authority in order to enforce the constitutional rule prohibiting
delegation of legislative authority to the executive branch.345 Having permitted
vast delegations of authority to the executive branch, the Seila Law Court’s new
limits on the tools Congress may possess to limit presidential abuse of delegated
authority are deeply problematic.
C. FURTHER IMPLICATIONS
The need to confine the implications of the unitary executive theory in light
of its propensity to create authoritarian government has more fine-grained
implications, as the theory has influenced legal practice even before the Supreme
Court’s recent endorsement of the theory. This final Part suggests possible
implications for the laws on presidential obstruction of justice and congressional
authority to subpoena information from the executive branch.
The analysis in Part II suggests that authoritarian heads of state have a
tendency to obstruct investigations into their own administration’s conduct.
Indeed, as the Turkish case study suggests, the desire to shield the head-of-state
and his supporters from prosecution for misconduct often provides motivation
for heads of state with authoritarian tendencies to assert control over
prosecution. This tendency to want to obstruct investigations has played a role
in impeachment cases in the United States, as the Congress charged Presidents
Nixon and Trump with obstruction of their investigations.
The unitary executive theory has an influence over the question of whether
a President can commit obstruction of justice.346 This issue surfaced during the
Mueller investigation of Russian interference in the 2016 election and in his
343. See Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2233–36 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
344. See id. at 2199 n.3 (majority opinion) (recognizing that Supreme Court cases have not established “an
exclusive criterion for distinguishing between principle and inferior officers”).
345. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2129 (2019) (the Court has not “felt qualified to secondguess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy judgment” that it may leave to those “executing or
applying the law” (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474–75 (2001))).
346. See Daniel J. Hemel & Eric. A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 1277,
1294–1303 (2018) (arguing that notwithstanding separation of powers concerns, the obstruction of justice statute
limits presidential conduct).
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report to Congress on that matter. William Barr, then a private citizen who had
worked at the DOJ, wrote an unsolicited memorandum to his former colleagues
arguing that the President’s ability to control prosecution makes it inappropriate
to charge him with obstruction of justice for seeking to have James Comey “let
go” of the investigation of Michael Flynn and firing Comey when he
persevered.347 As Attorney General, Barr concluded that President Trump had
not obstructed justice, despite evidence supporting an obstruction charge in the
Mueller Report.348 The Mueller Report itself pointedly disagrees with Barr’s
suggestion that the President cannot commit obstruction of justice.349
Mueller explained that the President only has the right to honestly direct
prosecution and investigations; he does not have authority to “corruptly”
influence investigations and prosecution, which is what the obstruction of justice
statute proscribes.350 This issue is separable from the question of whether the
DOJ can indict a sitting President during his term in office. If the President can
be liable for obstruction of Justice but cannot be prosecuted while in office, he
could be prosecuted once he leaves office.
Endorsement of the unitary executive theory might suggest that Barr’s view
is correct. But Seila Law does not deny that the Constitution aims to create a rule
of law that constrains corrupt presidential administration, even though its limits
on Congressional authority to protect the independence of top-level DOJ
officials may impede investigation of high-level wrongdoing. The entire Seila
Law Court failed to consider the possibility of presidential abuse of power.
Accordingly, the courts remain free to reign in presidential obstruction of justice
in future cases. In the short term, the DOJ and/or Congress should affirm that
the obstruction of justice statutes apply to the President.
The Trump Administration also resisted subpoenas, even those issued in
support of a House impeachment investigation.351 In doing so, it defied statutes
passed by Congress and signed into law by Presidents for more than 150 years
and practice dating back to the founding of the republic.352 Unitarians sometimes

347. See Memorandum from Bill Barr, U.S. Att’y General, to Deputy Rod Rosenstein, U.S. Deputy Att’y
Gen., and Steve Engel, U.S. Assistant Att’y Gen. (June 8, 2018), https://int.nyt.com/data/documenthelper/549june-2018-barr-memo-to-doj-mue/b4c05e39318dd2d136b3/optimized/full.pdf.
348. Mark Mazzetti & Charles Savage, Standing Where Barr Cleared Trump on Obstruction, Mueller
Makes a Different Case, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/29/us/politics/
mueller-barr.html (explaining that William Barr declared that the special counsel “amassed insufficient evidence
to accuse President Trump of a crime” whilst Robert Mueller offered “a sharply different perspective” on
obstruction of justice).
349. DOJ, II REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION 159 (2019), https://www.justice.gov/storage/report_volume2.pdf (stating that the President can
commit obstruction of Justice by firing the FBI director or closing an investigation into his campaign corruptly).
350. See id. at 168–69.
351. Charlie Savage, Trump Vows Stonewall of “All” House Subpoenas, Setting Up Fight Over Powers,
N.Y. Times (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/24/us/politics/donald-trump-subpoenas.html.
352. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927) (tracing the practice of securing information
needed by Congress back to 1792 and noting the support of James Madison and four other Framers); Kilbourn
v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880) (recognizing that Congress has a right to compel witnesses to appear
and answer question in support of impeachment and punish violations); see, e.g., In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661,
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resist congressional oversight as an inappropriate interference with executive
branch operations.353
Because oversight of administrations can yield information pointing to the
need for fresh legislation curbing abuses or revealing the need for impeachment,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly authorized Congress to investigate alleged
executive branch failures to implement the law properly when the inquiry might
legitimately lead to legislation.354 The Court subsequently recognized that
Congress has the authority to “probe corruption” and maladministration in the
executive branch.355
But the unitarian view of law execution as an exclusive domain of
presidential power (and the concomitant discounting of checks and balances)
has begun to lead the Court to narrow congressional oversight authority. In
Trump v. Mazars, decided less than two weeks after Seila Law, the Court
departed from prior precedent to narrow congressional power to obtain a
President’s private financial information, which can help check corruption in
presidential administration.356 The Court required a rather demanding showing
of legislative necessity to justify obtaining President Trump’s tax returns and
other financial information, imposing stricter limits on congressional authority
than it imposes when the President asserts a valid executive privilege (as I have
shown elsewhere).357 On the same day, however, the Court refused to grant the
same sorts of documents “heightened protection” from a local grand jury
subpoena.358
The courts should consider the lessons of democratic erosion in applying
Mazars on remand and in future cases. The rampant corruption found in
665–66 (1897) (discussing a statute passed in 1857 requiring witnesses summoned by a House of Congress or
one of its committees to appear and answer questions posed).
353. See Kitrosser, supra note 149, at 505 (noting that unitarian objections have been made to statutes
requiring executive branch officials to testify before Congress); cf. Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 532, 545–
546 (1917) (declining to permit the House to arrest a District Attorney for writing an intemperate letter, which
did not disrupt legislative proceedings).
354. See Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599, 607, 614–17 (1962) (upholding investigation of
individual criminal conduct, which led to legislation preventing misuse of union funds); Sinclair v. United States,
279 U.S. 263 (1928) (upholding imprisonment of oil company executive who did not fully cooperate in
congressional investigation of an oil leasing scandal, because the investigation might produce legislation);
McGrain, 273 U.S. at 150–51, 154, 176–80 (approving the arrest of the former Attorney General for failing to
cooperate with a congressional investigation of a failure to enforce anti-trust laws and other statutes); Senate
Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 727, 731–32 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en
banc) (approving demand for tapes revealing presidential misconduct in an election by a committee that might
recommend legislation, which became a basis for an impeachment investigation).
355. Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 194–95, 200 n.33 (1956) (characterizing McGrain and Sinclair
as recognizing congressional authority to encourage “honest and effective government” by investigating
corruption and noting established authority to policy maladministration).
356. See Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019, 2033–34 (2020) (repudiating the lower courts’ approach of
treating a subpoena of presidential papers as just like any other congressional subpoena).
357. See David M. Driesen, Stealth Executive Privilege: Trump v. Mazars, JURIST: LEGAL NEWS &
COMMENTARY (July 28, 2020, 7:30 AM), https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2020/07/david-driesen-trumpmazars/ (discussing the test articulated in Mazars and comparing it to the balancing test governing executive
privilege).
358. See Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412, 2429 (2020).
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autocratic regimes and the importance of its public disclosure as a check on
autocracy suggests that the courts should place a lot of weight on the Mazars
Court’s rejection of a requirement that Congress show that the financial records
it seeks are “demonstrably critical” to legislation in order to obtain documents
and interpret the necessity showing the Court did require in a permissive
manner.359 By denying Congress a role in safeguarding conscientious employees
from abusive removal the Court makes the elections and impeachment even
more important as checks on abuse of presidential power toward autocratic ends
and the Court should not impede the discovery of maladministration, which can
lead to discovery of unknown high crimes and misdemeanors or information that
can inform the electorate.360 Furthermore, the Horizontal Sweeping Clause
supports the argument that Congress has a legitimate role to play in ensuring
faithful law execution. While Seila Law declined to give the Horizontal
Sweeping Clause effect in the removal context, the Supreme Court has already
held that the Necessary and Proper Clause does protect its subpoena power.361

CONCLUSION
The experience indicating that centralized head of state control over the
executive branch of government provides a pathway to autocracy suggests that
the Court committed a grave error in Seila Law. In future cases, the Court should
consider the possibility of abuse of presidential power, not just abusive
bureaucracy. And it should narrowly construe or overrule Seila Law as a longterm danger to the rule of law and democracy.

359. See Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2032 (disagreeing with the President’s argument that the “House must show
that the financial information” sought “is ‘demonstrably critical’ to its legislative purpose.” (quoting Senate
Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 498 F.2d at 731)); see, e.g., MAGYAR, supra note 215
(describing Hungarian corruption under Orbán in detail); cf. Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140
S. Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020) (putting great weight on the President’s electoral accountability as a mechanism to
check the executive branch’s threats to liberty).
360. Cf. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2207 (2020) (arguing that various congressional powers make presidential
removal authority more important than it would be otherwise).
361. See id. (rejecting the argument that specific congressional powers under the Horizontal Sweeping
Clause support congressional power over removal); In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671 (1897) (explaining that
the Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to provide for the enforcement of its subpoenas); cf.
Mazars, 140 S. Ct. at 2031 (“Congress has no enumerated constitutional power to conduct investigations or issue
subpoenas.”); David M. Driesen & William C. Banks, Implied Presidential and Congressional Power, 41
CARDOZO L. REV. 1301, 1339 (2020) (explaining that the modern Supreme Court does not apply the Necessary
and Proper Clause to vindicate congressional rights in separation of powers cases but uses analogous means/ends
reasoning to enhance presidential power).

